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NOTE
THE STEM CELL COMPROMISE:
A WOLF IN SHEEP'S CLOTHING,
CONSTITUTIONAL IMPLICATIONS OF
THE BUSH PLAN
Atossa M Alavi t
"I have made this decision with great care, and I pray it is the
right one."' These were President Bush's final thoughts after he an-
nounced his plan for federal "funding" of human stem cell research,
issued from his ranch on August 9, 2001. In those remarks, the Presi-
dent concluded that federal funds can be used to support research us-
ing human embryonic stem cell lines that were derived before that
date, because for these cells, "the life and death decision has been
already made."2
On August 27, the National Institutes of Health (NIH) reported
that the President's decision permits federal funding for research on
64 stem cell lines. 3 On September 5, NIH announced that it had con-
cluded a Memorandum of Understanding with WiCell to allow the
National Institutes of Health intramural researchers access to the lines
owned by WiCell. 4 On October 9, the House Appropriations Commit-
I J.D. Candidate, Case Western Reserve University School of Law. I would
like to thank Professor Jonathan L. Entin for all his suggestions and guidance.
1 Remarks by the President on Stem Cell Research, at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/ releases/2001/08/20010809-2.html (Aug. 9, 2001).
2 Id.
3 See Statement by Tommy G. Thompson, Secretary of Health and Human
Services, Regarding Stem Cell Lines (Aug. 27, 2001), available at
http://www.hhs.gov/news/press/2001pres/20010827a.html (explaining that the Na-
tional Institute of Health has named 10 laboratories in the world which meet President
Bush's criteria for receiving federal funding to conduct research on 64 embryonic
stem cell lines).
4 See NIH News Release, National Institutes of Health and WiCell Research
Institute, Inc., Sign Stem Cell Research Agreement, at
http://www.nih.gov/news/pr/sep2001/od-05.htm (Sept. 5, 2001) (noting, however,
that "WiCell ... will receive a fee to cover its handling and distribution expenses in
supplying these cell lines").
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tee approved report language accompanying the fiscal year 2002 NIH
appropriations bill clarifying that the ban on human embryo research
using federal funds did not limit federal support for stem cell re-
search.5
The national debate preceding Bush's announcement blurred the
conventional lines between conservatives and liberals. Polls showed
that many Americans who consider themselves conservatives are
"split right down the middle" on whether they support stem cell re-
search. 6 Some pro-choice Americans actually oppose embryonic cell
research, and several anti-abortionists, such as Senator Orrin Hatch,
favor stem cell research.7
The WiCell Research Institute, Inc is a nonprofit institution, and an off-shoot of Uni-
versity of Wisconsin, which was established in October 1999 to advance research in
the area of stem cells. It owns the patent on the first successfully established human
embryonic stem cell lines, dubbed Wisconsin Stem CellsTM (patent number: US
5843780, "Primate Embryonic Stem Cells," issued December 1, 1998; other U.S. and
foreign patent applications pending). These cells were isolated by a team of scientists
from the University of Wisconsin-Madison headed by Dr. Thomson. Dr. Thomson is
the Scientific Director of the WiCell Institute. See WiCell Website, at
http://www.wicell.org/news_features.htm (last visited Sept. 29, 2002).
On September 4, the Public Health Service (PHS) signed a Memorandum of Under-
standing (MOU) with WiCell for use by PHS researchers of WiCell's five existing
human embryonic stem cell lines. The agreement permits PHS scientists, such as
those working in the NIH intramural program, to freely publish the results of their
research and permits PHS to retain ownership to any new intellectual property that
might arise from the conduct of such research. In addition, the MOU provides a
"Simple Letter of Agreement" to govern the transfer of cell lines to individual labora-
tories with minimal administrative burden. Furthermore, WiCell has agreed to make
stem cells available to PHS grantees under the same terms and conditions as those
provided to PHS scientists. Wendy Baldwin, Statement of Wendy Baldwin, Ph.D.
Deputy Director for Extramural Research National Institutes of Before the SenateAp-
propriations Subcomm. on Labor, Health and Human Services, Educ., and Related
Agencies (Oct. 31, 2001), at
http://www.nih.gov/news/stemcell/l0310extramural.htm (last visited Sept. 29,
2002). The fee to academic researchers for obtaining Wisconsin Stem CellsTM of a
single origin is $5,000. WiCell website, at
http://www.wicell.org/Faqsresearcher.htm (last visited Sept. 29, 2002).
5 See Appropriations: House Subcomm. Passes Labor-HHS Bill, AM.
HEALTH LINE, Oct. 4, 2001, LEXIS, News & Business, Science & Technology, Medi-
cal & Healthcare (explaining the committee's language).
6 See Politics, Science, Morality Of Stem Cell Issue. Remarks of Capitol
Hill producer Donna Bash to a CNN reporter (July 18, 2001), available at
http://www5.cnn.com/200l/ALLPOLITICS/07 /18/Bash.debrief.focus.
7 See also Aaron Zitner & Marlene Cimons, Nominee Crosses Stem Cell
Divide: Tommy G. Thompson, set to join Bush's Cabinet, has reconciled his anti-
abortion views with controversial research on embryos, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 18, 2001, at
A 13. (noting other pro-life supporters of human embryonic stem cell research such as
Sen. Strom Thurmond (R-S.C.), former Sen. Connie Mack (R-Fla.), and Wisconsin
Gov. Tommy G. Thompson); Robin Toner, The Abortion Debate, Stuck in Time, N.Y.
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Critics of federal funding of stem cell research maintain that tax
dollars should not be used for anything that results in deliberate de-
struction of an embryo. On the other hand, people with diseases that
might be treated using stem cells argue that research is a more noble
use for unwanted embryos than the alternatives these embryos face.
After Bush's announcement, the debate shifted to the 64 existing cell
lines. What was the evidence that these cells meet the criteria re-
quired for utility? So far, we have only the assurances of Health and
Human Services Secretary, Tommy Thompson, and his colleagues at
the NIH.8
The focus of this Note is to challenge the constitutionality of the
line drawn by the President's Statement, which conditions receipt of
federal funds for stem cell research on researchers agreeing to work
on the already available 64 cell lines approved by the government.
After a brief scientific background on the nature of stem cells, Part II
explores the status of science under the Constitution and concludes
that strong arguments support the recognition of special first amend-
ment protection for scientific inquiry, at least to the extent that any
restriction on its exercise must be subject to close examination. Part
III examines the claimed government interests in regulating stem cell
research. It concludes that the purported government interest in sav-
ing the lives of embryos fails both the stringent test applied to content-
based regulations, and the less demanding balancing test applied to
non-content based regulation. Therefore, given these interests, the
government would not be able to either affect a total ban on stem cell
research, or impose a limitation on researchers requiring them to work
exclusively on the currently available 64 stem cell lines. Finally, Part
IV examines government funding decisions and asks whether the
same government, who could not directly limit stem cell research, can
nevertheless impose certain restrictions on stem cell researchers
through its funding decisions. First it establishes that there is no obli-
gation on government to fund a particular area of research, whatever
its merits. But once the government decides to fund a certain activity,
its decision is subject to scrutiny under the doctrine of unconstitu-
tional conditions. Applying this doctrine to the restriction imposed by
the Bush plan, it becomes apparent that because of the way federally
funded research is managed, particularly the way the WiCell agree-
TIMES, Jan. 21, 2001, § 4, at 1 (quoting Sen. Gordon Smith as saying, "My pro-life
beliefs guide me to make life better for the living as well, to relieve suffering where
there is pain, and to find cures for deadly diseases wherever possible").
8 Harold Varmus & Douglas Melton, The Stem-Cell Compromise, WALL ST.
J., Aug. 14, 2001, at A14.
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ment is drafted, the federal restriction will not only affect those scien-
tists who apply for NIH funding, but also scientists working in the
same institution who do not. Moreover, since the federal government
enjoys a near monopoly power in the field of funding for basic bio-
medical research, it's funding of "some" stem cell research will effec-
tively discourage any future private funding in the area. This will
result not only in an increase in the government's monopoly in this
field but more importantly, halt the progress of stem cell research,
thus achieving the very same goal which the government could not
accomplish directly.
In conclusion, the Note argues that while stem cell research re-
mains legal, scientists working on this research should be able to
make scientific decisions free of governmental interference. To re-
move the coercive effect of the interference, government should de-
cide either to fund, or not to fund, all stem cell research. At a time
when, from a scientist or a patient's point of view, a "good" result will
be a congressional resolution to fund all stem cell research, and a
"bad" decision one that would cut federal funding to all stem cell re-
search, the current Bush plan presents an "ugly" dilemma; on the face
of it, it encourages research on stem cells by providing funding for a
limited number of currently available cells. But the overall effect of
the plan is to freeze a fast growing area of great potential by influenc-
ing the private/public funding balance, and by restricting stem cell
researchers' freedom to conduct their research.
I. BACKGROUND
A. What Are Stem Cells?
"A stem cell is a special type of cell that has the unique capacity
to renew itself' indefinitely, and to give rise to daughter cells that can
form specialized cells. "Although most cells of the body" (like heart
or skin cells) are specialized, or committed, "to conduct a specific
function, a stem cell is uncommitted until it receives a signal to de-
velop into a specialized cell." 9 Given the appropriate signal, these
cells can be directed to specialize and become the cells of the many
organs of the body. Therefore, the potential of stem cells is in "regen-
erative medicine" or "tissue-replacement therapy" that seeks to restore
9 NIH, STEM CELLS: SCIENTIFIC PROGRESS AND FUTURE RESEARCH
DIRECTIONS ES- 1 (2001), available at
http://www.nih.gov/news/stemcells/scireport.htm (last reviewed May 2, 2002) [here-
inafter NIH REPORT].
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lost function in damaged organs by replacing the lost or damaged
cells.
The list of diseases and injuries cited as targets of stem cell ther-
apy include: Parkinson's disease, diabetes, heart disease, Alzheimer's
disease, osteoporosis, and spinal cord injury, or indeed any disorder
that results from death or dysfunction of one or a few cell types.
There are currently few or no treatment options for most of these dis-
eases.' Other potential benefits from stem cell research include the
study of human development, which may have important conse-
quences in understanding birth defects, infertility, pregnancy loss, and
developing gene targets for new drugs."
Embryonic stem cells (ES cells) are found in the inner cell mass
of the human blastocyte, an early stage of a developing four- to seven-
day-old embryo.' 2 For the first time in 1998, Dr. James Thomson and
colleagues successfully isolated human embryonic stem cells and de-
veloped a procedure to induce the cells to proliferate or "self-renew"
indefinitely. 13 The trick is to get these cells to grow in an undifferen-
tiated state while maintaining their "pluripotency," i.e., their potential
to specialize or differentiate into specialized adult cells. These undif-
ferentiated self-renewing cells are known as cell lines or "immortal"
cells.
Many adult organs contain a few "adult" stem cells, which are
again undifferentiated and capable of differentiating into, and produc-
10 The potential US patient populations who may benefit from stem-cell
research has been estimated as follows:
Condition Number of patients
Cardiovascular disease 58 million
Autoimmune disease 30 million
Diabetes 16 million
Osteoporosis 10 million
Alzheimer's disease 5.5 million
Parkinson's disease 5.5 million
Spinal Cord injuries 0.25 million
Birth defects 0.15 million/year
Daniel Perry, Patients' Voices: The Powerful Sound in the Stem Cell Debate, 287
ScI. 1423 (Feb. 28, 2000).
11 James A. Thomson et al., Embryonic Stem Cell Lines Derived from Hu-
man Blastocystss, 282 Sci. 1145, 1146 (Nov. 6, 1998).
12 NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, STEM CELLS AND THE FUTURE OF
REGENERATIVE MEDICINE 31 (2001) [hereinafter NRC REPORT] (this study was pre-
pared by the Committee on the Biological and Biomedical Applications of Stem Cell
Research, formed by the National Research Council's Board on Life Sciences and
Institute of Medicine's Board on Neuroscience and Behavioral Health).
13 Thomson, supra note 11, at 1145. In Thomson's study, five stem cell lines
were developed from 14 pre-implantation IVF embryos donated after informed con-
sent and institutional review board approval. Id.
2003]
HEAL TH M TRIX
ing the normal cells of the organ in which they are found.' 4 In the
past two years, studies have suggested that some adult stem cells are
able not only to replenish damaged cells of the tissue they are found
in, but also to differentiate into cells of other tissues.15 Although ethi-
cally more acceptable, there are major disadvantages to the use of
adult stem cells, e.g., they are few, difficult to isolate, and difficult to
grow in the laboratory, they cause immune rejection when trans-
planted from one person to another, and there can be unacceptable
delays in finding a match in spinal trauma cases or potential problems
if cells of one organ are made to specialize into the cells of another
organ. These restrictions limit the use of these cells in all situations.' 6
Moreover, most reports of adult cells are from animal studies. Very
few, usually unconfirmed reports of multipotent human adult stem
cells exist. 17
Much research remains to be done before the potential of human
embryonic or adult stem cells can be realized. First, much of our pre-
14 The premiere adult stem cell is the one responsible for the success of bone
marrow transplants. The hematopoietic (or "blood producing") stem cells are capable
of differentiating into all the eight different types of cell found in the blood. Bone
marrow transplants have been successful in treating cancers of the blood (leukemia
and other cancers), inherited blood disorders, and diseases of the immune system.
However, the success of bone marrow transplants is limited by the low availability of
these stem cells in the transplanted tissue. Most transplanted tissues are "contami-
nated" with other cells, which, ironically, can attack the "host" or transplant recipient,
because they are cells of the immune system that recognize the "host" as "foreign."
Such an attack is potentially lethal and is the reason why bone marrow transplant
recipients are required to take high doses of immune-suppressant drugs for the rest of
their lives, even though the transplants are usually from a sibling with a close genetic
match. Since there is evidence that transplants of purified and concentrated popula-
tions of blood-forming adult stem cells greatly reduce such unwanted side effects,
research in this area is highly important. However, obtaining purified stem cells is a
major challenge because these cells are difficult to isolate, purify, and culture outside
the body. See NRC REPORT, supra note 12, at 19-29 (discussing human adult stem
cells).
15 See NRC REPORT, supra note 12, at 16 (summarizing two studies demon-
strating the multipotency of adult stem cells).
16 See id. at 16-17 (noting the difficulties of using adult stem cells in re-
search). For successful use of adult stem cells in future regenerative therapies, much
work needs to be done to make isolation and culture of these cells easier. There may
also be promise in "deprogramming" an intermediate cell (intermediate or progenitor
cells are intermediate between a blank stem cell and differentiated adult cell) and
"reprogramming" them to produce the cell type of interest.
17 Id. at 28. More studies on adult stem cells are becoming available, for
example see e.g., Sylvia P. Westphal, Is This the One, NEW SCIENTIST, 26 Jan. 2002,
at 4, available at http://www.newscientist.com/news/news.jsp?id=ns99991826 (re-
porting on the discovery of an adult stem cell which can "turn into every single tissue
in the body").
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sent knowledge about stem cells comes from animal studies, whose
cell behavior may differ substantially from human cell behavior.'
8
Furthermore, major questions remain unanswered about the genetic or
environmental factors in the body that control the fate of stem cells.
B. History of Stem Cell Research Regulation and Funding
Generally, the regulations governing research on human beings
are codified in the Federal Policy for the Protection of Human Sub-
jects. Subpart A 19 requires establishment of Institutional Review
Boards (IRBs) to approve all federally funded human subjects re-
search, and subpart B20 contains specific provisions applicable to fed-
eral grants and research involving the fetus, pregnant women, and
human in vitro fertilization (IVF). These regulations primarily ad-
dress research that may adversely affect living fetuses and provide for
additional IRB duties beyond those in subpart A. They also restrict
the use of pregnant women as research subjects, and demand minimal
risk standards for therapeutic activities directed towards fetuses in
utero.21
Before the presidential statement, no federal funds had been used
to support stem cell research from either human embryos or human
fetal tissue.22 This is because of a ban on federal funding of research
involving embryos, expressed statutorily through a Rider attached to
the Omnibus Consolidated and Emergency Supplemental Appropria-
tions Act for the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS),
Education and Related Agencies. 23 The Rider prohibits HHS from
using appropriated funds for the creation of human embryos for re-
search purposes or for research in which human embryos are de-
stroyed.24
18 See NRC REPORT, supra note 12, at 29 (noting for example the differences
between mouse and human stem cells). For example a comparison of mouse and
human blood-producing stem cells showed only about half of the genes expressed in
mouse cells correspond to genes expressed in the human cells.
'9 See 45 C.F.R. §§ 46.102, 103, 107, 108, 109, 111 (1999) (outlining the
process by which an institutional review board is created and the necessity of ap-
proval for federally funded research).
20 45 C.F.R. § 46.201(a) (1999).
21 45 C.F.R. § 46.207.
22 For example, Dr Thomson's research at the University of Wisconsin was
funded privately by Geron Corporation.
23 Omnibus Consolidated and Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act,
Pub. L. No. 105-277, § 511 (a), 112 Stat. 2681 (1998) [hereinafter The Rider].
24 The current rider, section 510 of the FY2000 Labor, HHS and Education
Appropriation in Pub. L. 106-13, prohibits HHS from using federal funds for "(1) the
creation of a human embryo or embryos for research purposes; or (2) research in
2003]
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The Rider, however contained a "loophole." It did not ban the
funding of embryo-related research that poses no risk to embryos.
Since stem cells have already been isolated from embryos, further
"stem cell" research poses no such risk. Following the 1998 an-
nouncement on the derivation of human embryonic stem cells, NIH
director Dr. Harold Varmus requested a legal opinion from HHS on
whether federal funds could be used to support research on human
embryonic stem cells. In response, in January 1999, Harriet Rabb, the
General Counsel of HHS, issued a memorandum expressing her legal
opinion that the statutory prohibition (the Rider) did not extend to
research using human pluripotent stem cells because such cells are not
"embryos" within the statutory definition. This opinion was re-
peated in a Fact Sheet issued by HHS, also in January 1999.26 As a
result, HHS maintained that NIH could support research that uses
stem cells but could not support research which derives stem cells
from embryos.27
In June 2000, the National Bioethics Advisory Committee
(NBAC), after months of scientific, religious, and philosophical re-
search and debate, issued its report.28  The report stated that
"[r]esearch involving the derivation and use of human [embryonic
stem] cells from embryos remaining after infertility treatments should
be eligible for federal funding"29 and recommended that the federal
which a human embryo or embryos are destroyed, discarded, or knowingly subjected
to risk of injury or death greater than that allowed for research on fetuses in utero
under 45 C.F.R. 46.208(a)(2) and section 498(b) of the Public Health Service Act (42
U.S.C. 289g(b))." The term "human embryo or embryos include[s] any organism, not
protected as a human subject under 45 C.F.R. 46 ... that is derived by fertilization,
parthenogenesis, cloning, or any other means from one or more human gametes
[sperm or egg] or human diploid cells [cells that have two sets of chromosomes, such
as somatic cells]." Dept. of Labor, Health and Human Services, Education, and Re-
lated Agencies Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 105-78, § 513(a), 11l Stat. 1467,
1517 (1997).
25 Memorandum from Harriet S. Rabb, General Counsel, DHHS, to Harold
Varmus, M.D., Director, NIH, at 1 (Jan. 15, 1999) [hereinafter Rabb Memorandum].
The finding was based, in part, on HHS determination that the Rider defines an em-
bryo as an organism. Human embryonic stem cells are not and cannot develop into an
organism; they lack the capacity to become organisms even if they are transferred to a
uterus.
26 HHS Fact Sheet, Human Pluripotent Stem Cell Research Guidelines,
available at http://www.hhs.gov/news/press/2001.html (June 19, 2001). See also
Rabb Memorandum.
27 See HHS Fact Sheet, supra note 26.
28 Nat'l Bioethics Advisory Comm., Ethical Issues in Human Stem Cell
Research (1999), available at http://www.bioethics.gov [hereinafter NBAC REPORT].
29 Nat'l Bioethics Advisory Comm., Ethical Issues in Human Stem Cell
Research: Executive Summary, iv. (1999), available at http://www.bioethics.gov.
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government fund research on stem cells derived from "leftover" IVF
embryos, as well as research in deriving the cells from embryos, by
way of exception to the present ban.
30
After receipt of the Rabb memorandum, NIH announced that it
planned to prepare new guidelines for embryonic stem cell research in
accordance with the HHS interpretation of the law.
After notice and comment,31 it issued a revised and final version
of the Guidelines on Stem Cell Research permitting federally financed
researchers to work on human embryonic stem cells.32 The Guide-
lines proposed specific criteria for informed consent for using stem
cells, proposed the establishment of a "Human Pluripotent Stem Cell
Review Group," and enumerated areas of research involving stem
cells that would be ineligible for NIH funding.
33
Before the Presidential announcement of August 2001, the NIH
Guidelines were the "definitive authority on the funding of [stem] cell
research. 34  However, in April 2001, the Bush Administration or-
dered the NIH to postpone a meeting of the Human Pluripotent Stem
Cell Review Group, who were scheduled to consider the first applica-
tion for research grants.35 In addition, in response to a lawsuit filed in
the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia seeking injunctive
30 id.
31 The NIH requested public comment on the Draft Guidelines through Feb-
ruary 22, 2000, after which final guidelines were to be drafted. It received 50,000
comments. See NIH News Release, NIH Publishes Draft Guidelines for Stem Cell
Research (Dec. 1, 1999), at http://www.nih.gov/news/pr/ dec99/od-01.htm (providing
notification of draft guidelines to be published in the Federal Register on Dec. 2, 1999
for comment). See also Notices: Dept. of Health and Human Servs., Nat'l Insts. of
Health; Draft Nat'l. Insts. of Health Guidelines for Research Involving Human Pluri-
potent Stem Cells, 64 Fed. Reg. 67,576 (proposed Dec. 2, 1999); Notices: Dept. of
Health and Human Servs., Nat'l. lnsts. Of Health, Nat'l. Insts. of Health Guidelines
for Research Using Human Pluripotent Stem Cells, 65 Fed. Reg. 51,976 (Aug. 25,
2000) (the deadline for comment was extended through Feb. 22, 2000, during which
time the NIH received 50,000 responses culminating in these final guidelines. Cor-
rections found in 65 Fed. Reg. 69,951. A portion of the finalized guidelines were
withdrawn in 66 Fed. Reg. 57,107.
32 National Institutes of Health Guidelines for Research Using Human Pluri-
potent Stem Cells, 65 Fed. Reg. 51,976 (Aug. 25, 2000).
13 Id. at 51,980 (Part I.A.2.e, "Informed Consent"); id. at 51,981 (Part IV.A,
"The NIH Human Pluripotent Stem Cell Review Group); id at 51,981 (Part III, "Ar-
eas of Research Involving Human Pluripotent Stem Cells That Are Ineligible for
Funding").
34 See Gabriele S. Gross, Federally Funding Human Embryonic Stem Cell
Research: An Administrative Analysis, 2000 Wis. L. REV. 855, 869 (2000) (arguing
that a hypothetical challenge to the NIH Guidelines or the 1999 HHS interpretation of
federal law should fail under the Chevron two-step analysis).
35 Rick Weiss, Bush Administration Order Halts Stem Cell Meeting, WASH.
POST, Apr. 21, 2001, at A2.
20031
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relief to halt the federal funding of stem cell research,36 a judge or-
dered a temporary halt on federal funding until completion of the
Bush Administration's review.37 As a result, the NIH did not fund
any research on human embryonic stem cells before the Presidential
Statement.
C. Objections to Bush's Plan
1. Scientists and Patient Advocate Groups
The concern of scientists over the limitations of the Bush plan is
summarized in a report released by the National Research Council
(NRC) on September 11, 2001. 3  After organizing a workshop at
which the NRC .committee heard from many leading scientists, phi-
losophers, ethicists, and legal scholars,39 it concluded that (i) studies
with human stem cells are essential and should continue; (ii) because
of important biological differences between adult and embryonic stem
cells research on both adult and embryonic human stem cells should
be pursued; and (iii) because of the deterioration of stem cells over
time,40 and because "existing stem cell lines have been cultured in the
presence of non-human cells or serum that could lead to potential hu-
man health risks," it is necessary to develop new stem cell lines in the
future.41 It added:
36 See Joseph Curl, Judge Halts Stem-Cell Research Pending HHS Review,
WASH. TIMES, May 11, 2001, at A3. The lawsuit was filed by a public interest firm,
Human Life Advocates, and the named plaintiffs included an adoption agency and the
Christian Medical Association; Stem Cell Research Opponents to Sue Thompson,
NIH, AM. HEALTH LINE, Mar. 8, 2001, LEXIS, News Library, HLTLNE File (summa-
rizing recent newspaper articles regarding suit brought against HHS Secretary and
NIH and the opposition to stem cell research).
37 Nightlight Christian Adoptions v. Thompson, No. 1.01 CV 00502 (D.D.C.
May 4, 2001) (order staying the case pending the outcome of the Bush Administra-
tion's review of the NIH funding guidelines).
38 See NRC REPORT, supra note 12 (explaining limitations in research fund-
ing and support facing stem cell research organizations).
39 Audio files of the speaker's presentations are available at
http://www.nationalacademies.org/stemcells.
40 "Over time, all cell lines in tissue culture change, typically accumulating
harmful genetic mutations. There is no reason to expect stem cell lines to behave
differently. In addition, most existing stem cell lines have been cultured in the pres-
ence of non-human cells or serum that could lead to potential human health risks.
Consequently, while there is much that can be learned using existing cell lines if they
are made widely available for research, such concerns necessitate continued monitor-
ing of these cells as well as the development of new stem cell lines in the future."
NRC REPORT, supra note 12, at 3 (emphasis added).
41 id.
[Vol. 13:181
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High quality publicly funded research is the wellspring of
medical breakthroughs. Although private, for-profit research
plays a critical role of translating the fruits of basic research
into medical advances that are broadly available to the public,
stem cell research is far from the point of providing therapeu-
tic products. Without public funding of basic research on stem
cells, progress toward medical therapies [as well as opportu-
nities for regulatory oversight and public scrutiny] is likely to
be hindered." 42
It recommended the establishment of a national advisory group
composed of researchers, ethicists, and other stakeholders at NIH to
oversee human stem cell research.43 Lastly, it recommended that re-
search on approaches that "prevent immune rejection of stem cells and
stem-cell-derived tissues [including the use of somatic cell nuclear
transfer] should be actively pursued." 4  These concerns have been
echoed by other scientists45 and patient advocate groups.
46
2. Ethicists and Religious Groups
Many in the pro-life movement viewed Bush's decision as a clear
step back, since it marked the first time that the federal government
would fund research involving the destruction of human embryos.
Reaction from the leaders of the movement, however, was mixed.
42 Id. (emphasis added).
43 See id. at 4 ("[s]uch a group should ensure that [research] proposals ... are
scientifically justified and should scrutinize such proposals for compliance with fed-
erally mandated ethical guidelines").
44id.
45 Advocates of federal funding of stem cell research include a group of 80
Nobel laureates. See Rick Weiss, Nobel Laureates Back Stem Cell Research; Group
of 80 Recipients Sends Letter Asking Bush Not to Block Funding for Studies, WASH
POST, Feb. 22, 2001, at A02 (urging to President Bush by esteemed scientist to allow
stem cell research to continue). Others include the American Society for Reproduc-
tive Medicine, Federation of American Societies for Experimental Biology (FASEB),
American Society for Cell Biology, and the Society for Developmental Biology;
Shirley J. Wright, Human Embryonic Stem-Cell Research: Science and Ethics, 87
AM. SCIENTIST 352, 356-57 (1999) (noting the number of important scientists and
scientific societies in favor of federal funding for continued stem cell research).
46 Perry, supra note 10, at 1423. In 1999, three dozen national nonprofit
patient organizations formed a coalition, the Patient's Coalition for Urgent Research
(CURe) to argue for public funding of human embryonic stem cell research under
NIH guidelines. The goals adopted by CURe were to achieve: (i) participation by the
broadest number of scientists under established peer-review mechanisms, thus re-
warding the most promising research and speeding progress, and (ii) public account-
ability and guidelines developed through processes that allow for public comment on
an area of science that has raised ethical concerns." Id.
2003]
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Some were pleased with the outcome. 47 But many others were disap-
pointed.4 8
Objections to stem cell research have generally centered on asser-
tions that the research will indirectly result in the destruction of em-
bryos, (which opponents of stem cell research consider as human be-
ings), and that it will influence a woman's decision to undergo an
abortion.49 The arguments in favor of imposing restrictions on stem
cell research are frequently supported by the assertion that research on
stem cells from adult tissues alone will lead to the development of
sought-after medical therapies.50 Research on adult stem cells has all
the necessary scientific potential and represents a morally less
problematic alternative that obviates the need for research on
47 See, e.g., Teresa R Wagner, The Stem Cell Storm, 17 WORLD & I 6267
(Feb. 1, 2002), available at 2002 WL 9015495. Wagner reported the National Right
to Life Committee saying: "We are delighted that President Bush's decision prevents
the federal government from becoming a party to any further killing of human em-
bryos for medical experimentation," and James Dobson of Focus on the Family say-
ing: "President Bush . . . has courageously upheld his promise to protect unborn
children." Other groups, such as the Christian Coalition and Paul Weyrich's Free
Congress Foundation, seemed equally pleased.
48 See, e.g., id. Quoted opponents included Bishop Joseph Fiorenza, presi-
dent of the U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops stating that: "The trade-off [the
president] has announced ... is morally unacceptable. The federal government, for
the first time in history, will support research that relies on the destruction of some
defenseless human beings for possible benefit to others," and Phyllis Schlafly's Eagle
Forum stating "President Bush made the wrong decision morally, scientifically, le-
gally, and politically." Similar statements of disapproval came from the Traditional
Values Coalition, Concerned Women for America, and Family Research Council.
49 Cf Sharon M. Parker, Bringing the "Gospel of Life" to American Juris-
prudence: A Religious, Ethical and Philosophical Critique of Federal Funding for
Embryonic Stem Cell Research, 17 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 771, 778-79
(2001) (discussing a memorandum issued to the Director of the NIH interpreting the
federal funding ban as not including human pluripotent stem cell research); cf Hear-
ing on Legal Status of Embryonic Stem Cell Research Before the Senate Appropria-
tions Subcomm. (Jan. 26, 1999) (testimony of Richard M. Doerflinger on behalf of the
Comm. for Pro-Life Activities, National Conference of Catholic Bishops), available
at http://www.nccbuscc.org/prolife/issues/bioethic/test99.htm (stating that embryonic
stem cell research will encourage the destruction of embryos and even provide federal
money as an incentive to such destruction).
50 For example, the organization DO NO HARM: The coalition of Ameri-
cans for Research Ethics, which is a "national coalition of researchers, health care
professionals, bioethicists, legal professionals, and others dedicated to the promotion
of scientific research and health care which does not harm human life" reacted to the
Bush announcement with a statement, released on July 1, 1999, which asserted the
human embryonic stem cell research is unethical and scientifically unnecessary, since
"other research methods which use stem cells from adults to develop treatments for
many diseases have recently been successful." Statement Summary, available at
http://www.stemcellresearch.org/statement/summary.htm (last visited February 11,
2003).
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lematic alternative that obviates the need for research on embryonic
stem cells.
But as mentioned above, there are several factors which these ar-
guments do not take into consideration. First, apart from the suc-
cesses of bone marrow and skin transplants, much of the remainder of
the evidence for the use of adult stem cells for regenerative therapies
is speculative, despite years of research. In this respect, research on
the use of adult stem cells is as primitive as that on embryonic stem
cells and there is simply no concrete information on their potential.
Second, their use has inherent difficulties which scientists have not
been able to overcome yet, such as the difficulty of isolating them
among the many other mature cells in each organ, keeping them in
culture for long periods of time, and their minute numbers which fre-
quently are inadequate to achieve transplantation. Third, much of the
work on these cells was done on animal models and the results are not
generalizable to humans. It must be noted that the study of embryonic
stem cells is likely to help advance our knowledge of the possible
applications of adult stem cells in the future. 51 The differences be-
tween adult and embryonic stem cells preclude adult cells from being
an alternative to research on embryonic cells.
II. STATUS OF SCIENCE UNDER THE
CONSTITUTION
To determine the extent to which government can restrict the
freedom of scientific inquiry, we must first examine the status of sci-
ence under the Constitution. There have been very few reported judi-
cial decisions that have addressed this issue directly. Supreme Court
and lower court decisions have referred to science in protective terms,
but the involvement of science in these cases has usually been collat-
eral to some other issue. Many commentators, however, have argued
that scientific research enjoys First Amendment protection.53 This
51 See NRC REPORT, supra note 12, at 2-3 ("[a]lthough stem cell research is
on the cutting edge of biological science today, it is still in its infancy").
52 See id. at 2 (noting that only "[a]dult stem cells from bone marrow "have
shown promise as a therapeutic tool).
53 Gary L. Francione, Experimentation and The Marketplace Theory of The
First Amendment, 136 U. PA. L. REv. 417, 430-59 (1987) (arguing that research,
though it involves free participation in the marketplace of ideas, does not by itself
provide a basis for First Amendment protection); John A. Robertson, The Scientist's
Right to Research: A ConstitutionalAnalysis, 51 S. CAL. L. REv. 1203, 1278 (1977);
James R. Ferguson, Scientific Inquiry and The First Amendment, 64 CORNELL L. REv.
639 (1979); Elizabeth Price Foley, The Constitutional Implications Of Human Clon-
ing, 42 ARIZ. L. REv. 647, 677-87 (2000) (arguing that banning human cloning would
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section will outline the various arguments which form the bases for
extending first amendment protection to scientific inquiry.54
A. Scientific "Speech" and "Full" First Amendment Protection
The process of scientific research and publication can be divided
into two distinct phases: a "research" phase, which can be defined as
conduct or activities carried out by a scientist which lead to the pro-
duction of data; and the "publication" or "communication" of the re-
sults of such research. There is no doubt that the communication of
scientific ideas, much like the communication of religious, artistic and
political ideas enjoys full first amendment protection.5 5 This section
presents the various arguments that have been put forward in this area.
1. History of the First Amendment and the Framers' Intent
An obvious starting point for the analysis of this issue is to con-
sider the framers' intent. Goldberg, a prominent proponent of the
protected status of science under the first amendment, examines the
text of the Constitution in light of the framers' obvious interest in sci-
ence and the view that science was a central consideration in drafting
the document, and concludes that "scientific speech" enjoys full first
amendment protection. 6
Goldberg argues that "the framers designed the Constitution in
part to protect freedom of science both through the establishment of
encroach on scientist's First Amendment "right of scientific inquiry"); Mathew B.
Hsu,, Banning Human Cloning: An Acceptable Limit on Scientific Inquiry or an Un-
constitutional Restriction of Symbolic Speech?, 87 GEO. L. REV. 2399, 2412-14
(1999) (arguing same). See Richard Delgado & David R. Millen, God. Galileo and
Government: Toward Constitutional Protection for Scientific Inquity, 53 WASH. L.
REV. 349 (1978) (arguing that scientific inquiry should be included within the field of
protected expression). See generally Steven Goldberg, The Constitutional Status of
American Science, 1979 U. ILL. L. F. 1 (discussing the development and significance
of an implied science clause in the constitution). But see Stephen L. Carter, The
Bellman, the Snark, and the Biohazard Debate, 3 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 358, 369-73
(1985) (questioning whether the right to research is a right protected under the rubric
of the First Amendment).
54 Other constitutional doctrines under which scientific research may enjoy
special protection include the Fourteenth Amendment right to personal liberty and
privacy, or the right to freedom of association. See, e.g., Robertson, supra note 53, at
1212-15 (explaining constitutional provisions that could provide protection for scien-
tific research). However, application of theses rights to scientific inquiry has gener-
ally not produced very strong arguments.
5 Id. at 1216 n.53, criticizing Bork's view that "[c]onstitutional protection
should be accorded only to speech that is ... [political]" (quoting Bork, Neutral Prin-
ciples and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1, 20 (1971)).
56 See Goldberg, supra note 53, at 2-7.
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religion clause, which prohibits government support for a traditional
adversary of science, and through the speech and press clauses, which
were understood from the outset to include scientific expression.' 57
Goldberg first argues that Jefferson, Madison, Hamilton, and Franklin,
who were men of the Enlightenment and who regarded liberty as be-
ing intimately related to science, were quite conscious of the suppres-
sion of Galileo's science by the Roman Catholic Church, and wanted
to make such action impermissible under the Constitution.58 There-
fore, one purpose behind the establishment clause was "to prevent the
suppression of enlightened science by the Church." 59 He then argues
that since communication and publication of scientific information are
the very essence of scientific enterprise, the First Amendment's
speech and press clauses were partly designed to protect science
against government restrictions and "to further progress in science."
60
Therefore, there is a strong argument that scientific speech, which at a
minimum means the publication of scientific findings, enjoys full first
amendment protection.
17 Id. at 1.
58 Id. at 5-7. One indicator of the framers' view on the relationship between
science and civil liberty, also relied upon by Goldberg, is a letter dated October 26,
1774, from the Continental Congress to the inhabitants of the Province of Quebec,
indicates that the Framers may well have assumed that the First Amendment protected
scientific inquiry:
The last right we shall mention, regards the freedom of the press. The im-
portance of this consists, besides the advancement of truth, science, moral-
ity, and arts in general, in its diffusion of liberal sentiments on the admini-
stration of Government, its ready communication of thoughts between sub-
jects, and its consequential promotion of union among them, whereby op-
pressive officers are shamed or intimidated, into more honourable and just
modes of conducting affairs.
Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson, 283 U.S. 697, 717 (1931). Although the quoted
passage refers to the freedom of the "press," it seems logical that the Framers were
referring to the First Amendment generally, including freedom of speech. It would
make little sense to allow the press to publish matters relating to the advancement of
science if scientists were prohibited from engaging in activities that advanced science.
59 See Goldberg, supra note 53, at 5 (supporting the concept that the estab-
lishment clause had several purposes).
60 Id. at 6. Goldberg goes on to analyze "the extensive entanglement of gov-
ernment with the scientific endeavor" through federal support which, unlike religion,
politics or the arts, science enjoys to a considerable extent. Id. at 1-2. He concludes
that there is an "implied science clause" in the First Amendment, to the effect that
"Congress may legislate the establishment of science, but shall not prohibit the free
exercise of scientific speech." See also id. at 33 (concluding that there is an "implied
science clause" in the First Amendment, to the effect that "Congress may legislate the
establishment of science, but shall not prohibit the free exercise of scientific speech").
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2. Science Defined in Obscenity Cases
Another basis for arguments in support of First Amendment pro-
tection for scientific speech is the Supreme Court's suggestions to this
effect in cases involving obscenity. 6' In Roth v. United States,62 while
holding that obscenity was not protected by the First Amendment, the
Court stated that portrayal of sex in "scientific works, is not itself suf-
ficient reason to deny material the constitutional protection of free-
dom of speech and press."63 Later in Miller v. California,64 when the
Court formulated a test for obscenity, the status of science was re-
tained. The Court held that the First Amendment "protects works
which, taken as a whole ... have serious literary, artistic, political or
scientific value. 65  In Paris Adult Theatre v. Slaton,66 the Court
"[p]revent[ed] unlimited display or distribution of obscene material,
which by definition lack any serious literary, artistic, political, or sci-
entific value as communication, [and so is] distinct from a control of
reason and the intellect.,
67
Since the Court has stated: "[T]he First Amendment ordinarily
prohibits courts from inquiring into the content of expression, except
in cases of obscenity or libel, and protects speech . . . regardless of
[its] motivation, orthodoxy, truthfulness, timeliness, or taste,, 68 the
implication is that expressive activity that does have serious "scien-
tific value," regardless of its orthodoxy or taste, should be protected.69
More specifically, in Henley v. Wise,70 while invalidating an obscenity
law that penalized maintenance and use of obscene materials by aca-
demic researchers at Indiana University, a District Court stated that
"the state has unconstitutionally intruded itself into [an area of] ...
protected activity ... the right of scholars to do research and advance
the state of man's knowledge.",7' These cases clearly demonstrate that
scientific speech lies within the full protection of the first amendment.
61 Id. at 13.
62 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
63 Id. at 487.
64 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
65 Id. at 24.
66 413 U.S. 49 (1973).
67 Id. at 67 (citations omitted).
68 Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 705 n.40 (1972).
69 See Foley, supra note 53, at 680-81 (stating that "[i]f the paradigmatic
example of what is protected against governmental encroachment by the First
Amendment is 'ideas' with serious literary, artistic, or scientific value, then the penul-
timate scientific idea, the hypothesis, should likewise fall within the ambit of pro-
tected exT ression") (citations omitted).
303 F. Supp. 62 (N.D. Ind. 1969).
" Id. at 66.
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3. Establishment Clause Cases
Another series of cases with indirect implications for the status of
science are three establishment clause decisions that struck down
challenges to the teaching of evolutionary theory. In Epperson v. Ar-
kansas,72 the Court invalidated an Arkansas statute barring the teach-
ing of evolution in public schools. The Court decided the case on the
ground that the statute was an unconstitutional establishment of relig-
ion, and after recognizing the State's "undoubted right to prescribe the
curriculum for its public schools," it asserted that this "does not carry
with it the right to prohibit ... the teaching of a scientific theory or
doctrine where that prohibition is based upon reasons that violate the
First Amendment [Establishment Clause]. 73 In Daniel v. Waters,74
the Sixth Circuit Court invalidated a Tennessee statute requiring the
teaching of evolution in public school to be accompanied by various
disclaimers. 75 Finally, in Moore v. Gaston County Board. of Educa-
tion.,76 a North Carolina District Court held in favor of a teacher who
was fired because he told a student he believed that man descended
from monkeys.77
Goldberg argues that "[t]o analyze these decisions ...without
reference to the role of science is misleading" because the content of
the Establishment Clause "depends upon the context in which religion
is operating., 78 By observing that the Court's constitutional scrutiny
seems to be more lax when "religion shapes our moral standards" than
"when religion shapes our scientific standards," Goldberg concludes
that the statutes at issue were struck down not only because they aided
religion, but because they aided religion "at the expense of science. 79
B. Scientific "Research" vs. "Speech"
Although scientific speech, i.e., the publication of scientific find-
ings, may enjoy full first amendment protection, the level of protec-
tion afforded to scientific "research," which involves the practical
steps a scientist must take to come to unravel such findings, can be
72 393 U.S. 97 (1968).
71 Id. at 107.
74 515 F.2d 485 (6th Cir. 1975).
71 Id. at 489.
76 357 F. Supp. 1037 (W.D.N.C. 1973).
17 Id. at 1043.
78 Goldberg, supra note 53, at 9-10.
79 See id. at 8, 10 (while Goldberg's makes this conclusion based on the
Arkansas statute, the rationale can be extended to the statutes at issue in the other
cases).
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different. So what is the status of "research" under the First Amend-
ment?
1. Research as a Form of Information Gathering
One logical observation is that scientific research is an indispen-
sable first step towards developing scientific speech. In this respect, it
is analogous to information gathering by journalists, an area which
has received attention by the Supreme Court in cases dealing with the
right to receive information, and the right to gather news as part of the
freedom of press clause of the First Amendment. Robertson argues
that to serve "the first amendment's purpose of assuring a free flow of
information ... all aspects of creating, gathering, disseminating, and
receiving information must be protected." 80  Since conducting re-
search is a necessary prerequisite to the production and gathering of
scientific knowledge, it should have the same constitutional status as
the dissemination itself.8 ' Robertson backs his argument with the
Supreme Court's expansion of first amendment protection to the doc-
trines of "receipt of information" and "right to gather news" stages
essential to publication.
(a) The Right to Receive Information: The Court has relied on the
right of a willing recipient to receive information from a willing
speaker in cases where it invalidated state restrictions on commercial
speech. For example, in Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Vir-
ginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc.,83 the Court struck down a stat-
ute that banned pharmacists from advertising prescription prices be-
cause it prevented consumers from obtaining that information. The
Court stated: "Freedom of speech presupposes a willing speaker. But
where a speaker exists ... the protection afforded is to the communi-
cation, to its source and to its recipients both.,84 Since the right to
receive information is exercised "only when a decision or desire to
acquire information has occurred," 85 it must rest on "a right to acquire
80 Robertson, supra note 53, at 1216.
8 Id. at 1216-18.
82 Id. at 1278.
" 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
84 Id. at 756. See also Linmark Assoc's, Inc. v. Township of Willingboro,
431 U.S. 85, 96 (1977) (striking down an ordinance banning the display of "for sale"
signs on home lawns because it infringed the consumer's right to acquire information
essential for economic decision making); Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 409
(1974) (invalidating a prison censorship regulations because of the non-inmates con-
stitutional right to send messages to willing recipients and to receive information from
willing communicants).
85 Robertson, supra note 53, at 1223.
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information from a source willing to provide it."' 86 Since scientists'
acquisition of knowledge and information during the research process
is a type of acquiring and seeking information from willing collabora-
tors or materials, it too should be protected under the same first
amendment right to receive information. 87 Therefore, "a right to re-
ceive information necessarily includes a right to research. 88 Hence,
"[i]f individuals, journalists, and the public have a right to obtain in-
formation from willing sources, then scientists must also have the
right to conduct research with willing sources or materials under their
lawful control."89
(b) The Right to Gather News: In a different line of cases, the
Court has interpreted the "freedom of press" specified in the first
amendment to include journalists right to gather news or information
from willing sources. In Branzburg v. Hayes,90 the Court recognized
that newsgathering itself, because of its essential role in developing
published information, has constitutional status.91  Moreover, the
Court has emphasized that "liberty of the press is not confined to
newspapers and periodicals ... [but] in its historic connotation com-
prehends every sort of publication which affords a vehicle of informa-
tion and opinion," 92 and that the informative function asserted by the
press in Branzburg "is also performed by lecturers, political pollsters,
novelists, academic researchers, and dramatists. 93 Using these cases,
Robertson argues that "the scope of freedom of the press depends on
the function that an individual performs and not on the description of
his profession." 94 Therefore, any person who performs an informative
function qualifies for the protection of freedom of the press. 95 Espe-
cially since researchers publish information and ideas "essential for
individual, social, and political decision making. 96
86 id.
87 id.
88 Id. at 1226.
89 Id. at 1278.
' 408 U.S. 665.
91 Id. at 681 (stating that the Court is not suggesting that seeking out the
news is not protected by the First Amendment). See also Burnham v. Oswald, 342 F.
Supp. 880, 885 (W.D.N.Y 1972) (stating that the right of the public to be informed
depends upon the right of the press to gather information and to have access to news
sources); Kovach v. Maddux, 238 F. Supp. 835, 839 (M.D. Tenn. 1965) (stating that
without the opportunity to gather and obtain the news, the fight to publish would be of
little value).
92 Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 452 (1938).
93 Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 705.
94 Robertson, supra note 53, at 1238.
95 Id.
96 Id. at 1239.
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2. Using the Model of Commercial Speech
Until 1976, it was the Court's position that purely commercial
speech was wholly unprotected by the first amendment. 97 It was
deemed to be a kind of commercial transaction which government
could regulate for any rational reason. Then in Virginia State Board
of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council,98 the Court re-
pudiated this position and acknowledged that commercial speech does
enjoy first amendment protection, albeit a lesser protection subject to
intermediate scrutiny.
The Court's landmark holding in Virginia Board of Pharmacy
rested on three notions: (a) that "the state's rationale was itself for-
bidden by the first and fourteenth amendments which preclude regu-
lating an activity on the premise that ignorance is preferable to knowl-
edge"; 99 (b) that the values of free speech are not limited to political
dialogue but extend to any exchange of ideas of information that
might make individual choices better informed;' 00 and (c) because just
as commercial information "is indispensable to the proper allocation
of resources in a free enterprise system, it is also indispensable to the
formation of intelligent opinions as to how that system ought to be
regulated or altered" so that "even if the First Amendment were
thought to be primarily an instrument to enlighten public decision
making in a democracy, we could not say that the free flow of infor-
mation does not serve that goal."'' So it seems possible that an area
traditionally thought to lie outside first amendment protection can be
characterized as protected speech because it contributes to the free
flow of ideas.
The argument for the inclusion of scientific inquiry within the
umbrella of first amendment protection is more compelling than that
made for commercial speech. It cannot be disputed that scientific
research is an important component of the public pool of information.
For example, Robertson asserts that
[s]cience provides information relevant to a wide variety of
individual and societal decisions ranging from one's views
about the nature of man and the universe and the wisdom of
governmental policies, to individual choices regarding the
97 Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52, 55 (1942)
98 Virginia Bd. Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 770-71.
99 LAURENCE TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 12-15, at 893-94 (2d
ed. 1988)d 4 Virginia Bd. Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 763.
... Id. at 765.
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purchase of certain products. Indeed, one cannot cope with
the exigencies of the modem world without access to a wide
range of scientific information. 
02
Moreover, much of commercial speech regulation is premised on
regulating false advertising, a concern that is not so apparent in scien-
tific inquiry because of the rigorous review processes that scientific
publications are subjected to, and the intent of the publication. In
sum, if the Court considers commercial speech as being worthy of
first amendment protection, it should surely extend this protection to
scientific inquiry.
3. Scientific Inquiry as "Symbolic Speech"
Commentators have also argued that scientific research should be
protected under the First Amendment as a form of expressive con-
duct.103 The Supreme Court has long protected conduct that commu-
nicates a message under the First Amendment. Examples of "expres-
sive conduct" include the wearing of black armbands in protest of the
Vietnam War,10 4 the display of an American flag with a superimposed
peace symbol, 0 5 or the refusal of school children to salute the flag. 1
0 6
While almost all speech arguably contains an element of conduct, the
Court, in Spence v. Washington, articulated a two-part test for
determining whether conduct is sufficiently expressive as to warrant
First Amendment protection: (1) the conduct must be intended to
"convey a particularized message"; and (2) there must be a substantial
likelihood that "the message would be understood by those who view
it."Ncientific research satisfies the two-pronged test of Spence. Scien-
tific experimentation is intended to "convey a particularized message"
about the value and utility of underlying intellectual ideas. One com-
mentator makes a strong argument that because "the expression of
102 Robertson, supra note 53, at 1216.
'03 See id. at 1216-18, 1239-40 (stating that research should receive constitu-
tional protection); Delgado & Millen, supra note 53, at 372-88; Hsu, supra note 53, at
2410-16.
104 Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 505-506
(1969) (wearing of black armband in protest of Vietnam War constitutes expressive
conduct protected by the First Amendment).
105 Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 410 (1974) (taping a peace sign on
an American flag was protected by the First Amendment because it was essentially a
form of expression).
106 West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 634 (1943)
(holding that saluting a flag is a form of speech and compulsory flag salutation
impermissibly compels expression and is against the First Amendment).
107 Spence, 418 U.S. at 410-11.
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scientific ideas depends on giving scientists the freedom to test [those]
ideas ... [and] because science depends on testing theories, the ex-
perimentation itself is the expression of scientific ideas and thus
speech protected by the First Amendment."' 0 8 A scientist conducts
experiments to either prove or disprove a hypothesis through the sci-
entific method. 09 Through experimentation, scientists express their
creativity and intellectuality in much the same way that musicians
express themselves through music or artists express themselves
through a painting or a sculpture.
A scientist who believes that science should be unrestrained and
scientists free to experiment could express such an idea either through
pure speech, or by actually engaging in experimentation which con-
veys the same message. Moreover, the extensive debate that such
activities have received in the public and political arena show that the
audience to whom the "speech" is directed understands the message.
In the context of research on human embryonic stem cells, research
expresses additional ideas about the nature of humanity, especially
human conception and individuality, the value of human embryos in
the search for cures for intractable diseases, and the acceptable scope
of scientific inquiry. Thus experimentation itself is a vivid embodi-
ment of symbolic speech.
Overall, the arguments for first amendment protection for scien-
tific endeavor as a part of scientific speech suggest that whatever level
of protection one accepts, regulations which result in restriction of
scientific activity must be carefully scrutinized. It is especially impor-
tant to analyze the reasons behind such regulations. The next section
will examine governmental interests in regulating stem cell research,
and whether they outweigh scientists' interests in continuing the re-
search.
III. GOVERNMENT INTERESTS IN REGULATING
SCIENTIFIC INQUIRY
In exploring the legitimacy of government control of scientific re-
search, concluding that scientific inquiry should, and would, be af-
forded some level of First Amendment protection does not end the
inquiry. Obviously, the right to engage in scientific research is not
absolute and is subject to the same limitations that apply to other
forms of protected "speech" (such as ordinary political, literary, and
108 Hsu, supra note 53, at 2412.
109 See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 590
(1993) (holding that Federal Rules of Civil Procedure places limits on the admissibil-
ity of scientific testimony by expert).
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artistic communication) or "conduct" (or symbolic speech) under the
first amendment.' 10 The question is whether the regulation in question
is necessary to further a compelling enough governmental interest."'
Therefore, it is necessary to consider the other side of the equation
and the enumerated government interests in regulating particular areas
of research. For this analysis, it is important to determine whether
government regulation of stem cell research is aimed at the communi-
cative impact of the research, or whether the regulation is content-
neutral and aimed at the non-communicative impact of the research
activity.
A. Content Based Regulations
Any adverse government action aimed at communicative impact
is presumptively at odds with the First Amendment. The primary con-
cern of the First Amendment is "that there be full opportunity for ex-
pression in all its varied forms to convey a desired message,""' 2 and in
order to serve these goals, the state should not make distinctions based
on the worth of ideas. In other words, the constitutional guarantee
means that "government has no power to restrict expression because
of its message, its ideals, its subject matter, or its content."' 13
A necessary corollary of accepting the notion that scientific
knowledge and information, like political speech, is within the protec-
tion of the First Amendment, 14 is that if the government enacts a
regulation aimed at the communicative impact of a particular scien-
tific activity, it must prove that either the speech is not protected by
the first amendment because it falls within one of the narrow excep-
tH0 See Goldberg, supra note 53, at 14 (discussing First Amendment limita-
tions relating to science). See also, Delgado and Millen, supra note 53, at 403 (stating
that scientific research, even basic research, maybe subject to restrictions based on
content but adding that a "stringent model of judicial review" is appropriate in such
cases); Robertson, supra note 53, at 1278 (stating that research may be restricted on
the basis of non-content related interests).
111 See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 26-27 (1976) (upholding federal law
limiting contribution limits to federal political candidates).
112 Young v. American Mini Theaters, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 76 (1976) (Powell,
J., concurring).
113 Police Dept. of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972) (invalidating a
ordinance prohibiting picketing in the vicinity of schools because by allowing excep-
tions for labor union picketing, the ordinance became content based). See also R.A.V.
v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382 (1992) (stating that the essence of the First
Amendment is that government cannot regulate speech based on its content and that
content-"based regulations are presumptively invalid").
114 Robertson, supra note 53, at 1215-16.
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tions, l l5 or that the regulation is necessary to further a "compelling
state interest." 116 The burden is a particularly heavy one, and the
government may not justify its content-based regulation by a claim
that the content of the expression has been voiced by other speakers,
or that the expression may be voiced in another place, at another time,
or in another manner. 1 7 Thus "the autonomy of the individual and of
the press from government's content-based restrictions is . . .nearly
absolute."' 18
Since embryonic stem cell research does not fall within any of the
enumerated exceptions, 19 its regulation would have to be justified as
necessary to a compelling state interest. Both sides of the debate
agree that the central issue in stem cell research is the harm done to
embryos, but they differ as to the level of protection abandoned IVF
embryos should be entitled to. It is the "moral status" of embryos as
"potential human beings" which lies at the heart of the debate. 20
Therefore the regulation of this research is related to the content of the
activity sought to be banned. In other words, it is the very essence of
the research that is distasteful to its opponents. This is apparent from
the moral objections to carrying out this research, and from the fact
that there are no such objections to research carried out on all other
human cells, an activity routinely performed for the benefit of basic or
115 For example, in Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-72
(1942), the Court singled out certain categories of speech as not representing
"speech" within the meaning of the first amendment because they are not an "essen-
tial part of any exposition of ideas," and because their "very utterance inflicts injury"
or "tends to incite immediate breach of the peace."
116 TRIBE, supra note 99, at § 12-8, at 833.
117 See Consolidated Edison Co. v. Pub. Service Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530, 540
n. 10 (1980) (stating that "we have consistently rejected the suggestion that a govern-
ment may justify a content-based prohibition by showing that speakers have an alter-
nate means of expression"); Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405 (holding that the
availability of other means are irrelevant when government prosecutes "for the ex-
pression of an idea through activity"); Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at
757-58 n.15 (holding as irrelevant the fact that other consumers might be able to
obtain the same information in some other ways).
18 TRIBE, supra note 99, at § 12-8, at 836.
119 These include: clear and present danger; fighting words, offensive speech
or hate speech; obscenity; defamation, and some types of commercial speech. In
general, unprotected speech is "utterances [that] are no essential part of any exposi-
tion of ideas [and] of slight value as a step to [the] truth." Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at
572. Clearly, stem cell research does not fall within any of these exceptions.
120 See, e.g., Kevin P. Quinn, Embryonic Stem Cell Research as an Ethical
Issue: On The Emptiness of Symbolic Value, 13 ST. THOMAS L. REv. 851, 854 (2001)
(reiterating the importance of the "symbolic" status of an embryo, stating that "[o]ne
clear starting point in the debate about the ethics and policy of stem cell research is
the moral status of the early human embryo").
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applied medical science. Therefore, any restriction on stem cell re-
search would "undoubtedly emanate from fears concerning the ex-
pressive content of [this] activity."' 12 A scientist who engages in stem
cell research expresses the idea that such research is "desirable, a type
of expressive conduct that upsets its opponents."'
122
If this content-based view of the regulation is accepted, a govern-
ment ban on stem cell research, or a direct limitation of such research
to the 64 available cells, will be struck down as unconstitutional if the
government interest in the limitation is not compelling enough to pass
strict scrutiny. Whether government interests pass this test will be
examined in the following sections.
B. Content-Neutral Regulations
Where government regulation is aimed at the non-communicative
impact of an act, its validity depends on balancing the competing in-
terests and ensuring that any regulation does not "unduly constrict the
flow of information and ideas."' 123 If the courts deem the activities in
question not particularly significant to the system of free expression,
government regulation will be upheld if it meets the four part O'Brien
test,12 4 which requires that (a) the regulation be "within the constitu-
tional power of the government"; (b) the regulation "further an impor-
tant or substantial governmental interest"; (c) the governmental inter-
est be "unrelated to the suppression of free expression"; and (d) the
incidental restriction on First Amendment freedoms be "no greater
than is essential to the furtherance of that interest."' 25 In other words,
government may regulate expressive conduct provided such regula-
tion serves an important, non-content-based interest, and the regula-
tion is narrowly tailored so the impact on communication is no more
than necessary to achieve the government's purpose. 126
121 Foley, supra note 53, at 685 (using the quoted fragment to argue that a ban
on human cloning would be content-based).
122 Id.
123 TRIBE, supra note 99, at § 12-2, at 791. In Turner Broadcasting System v.
FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 641-42 (1994), the Court formulated the general rule that con-
tent-based restrictions on speech must meet strict scrutiny, while content-neutral
regulation need only meet intermediate scrutiny.
124 United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 385 (1968).
125 Id. at 377.
126 See id. at 382 (finding the four part test was met in the government's pro-
hibition of draft card burning).
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C. Government Interests in the Context F Stem Cell Research
1. Roe v. Wade and the State Interest in Nonviable Embryos
One reason for the confusion surrounding the degree of interfer-
ence a state may exert over IVF embryos is the lack of Supreme Court
cases in this area. The closest decisions are abortion cases involving
in utero fetuses, and the decisions rely on balancing the government's
interests in preserving the lives of the fetus against the mother's con-
stitutional rights.
In Roe v. Wade,127 the Court held unconstitutional a Texas statute
making it a crime to procure or attempt to procure an abortion except
when necessary to save the mother's life.128 It concluded that the
"liberty" protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amend-
ment implicitly protected a woman's freedom to decide whether to
terminate a pregnancy. 29 But Roe also recognized that a state has two
legitimate interests during pregnancy, to preserve and protect the
health of the pregnant mother and to protect the potentiality of human
life. Both interests were found to "grow in substantiality as the
woman approaches term.' 30 The Court held that "with respect to the
State's important and legitimate interest in potential life, the 'compel-
ling' point is at viability. This is so because the fetus then presumably
has the capability of meaningful life outside the mother's womb."'131
Therefore, before the end of the first trimester of pregnancy, neither
state interest is sufficiently substantial to justify any intrusion on the
woman's freedom of choice.' 32 The Court did not resolve the difficult
question of when life begins,' 33 but after examining constitutional
definitions of "person" and other legal doctrines, concluded that "the
unborn have never been recognized in the law as persons in the whole
sense."
, 134
The strongest opponents of stem cell research would equate the
legal status of an um-implanted embryo with that of a fetus. But the
interests of preserving the "life" of such an embryo cannot be ana-
lyzed in isolation. The state has other interests, such as preserving the
lives of its citizens. This includes citizens who are sick, disabled or
127 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
128 Id. at 118.
129 Id. at 153.
130 Id. at 162-63.
131 Id. at 163.
132 Id.
' Id. at 159.
134 Id. at 162.
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dying, and the necessary medical costs they will incur. In this case,
where stem cell research has the potential of curing and saving the
lives of millions, preserving the life of an embryo that is destined for
inevitable destruction seems minuscule.
2. Preserving the Lives of Embryos and the Argument for "Potential"
Opponents of any research involving human embryos counter the
above argument with the notion that embryos should be protected
because they have the "potential" to develop into human life. But
upon closer scrutiny, and putting aside all emotions and applying
straight logic to the problem, it will become apparent that unwanted
IVF embryos have much less potential for life than their "fetus" coun-
terparts.
Singer and Dawson have examined whether the familiar claims
about the potential of the embryo in utero can be applied to the IVF
embryo in culture in the laboratory.135 They argue that from a poten-
tial point of view, the step that separates an in vitro embryo from an
embryo implanted in the uterus, i.e., implantation, is much more sig-
nificant than the fertilization of an egg by a sperm, 136 and that ulti-
mately, "the IVF embryo in the laboratory is like the egg and sperm,
and not like the embryo in the human body.' 37 They argue that while
the notion of potential may be relatively clear in the context of a natu-
rally occurring embryo inside a female body, which will go on to de-
velop into a full human being unless it is stopped, this notion becomes
problematic when it is extended to a laboratory situation, because
everything that happens to the in vitro embryo depends on what we
decide to do with it, and because the embryo will not develop into a
full person unless it is implanted into a uterus. 138 Using this analysis,
"the development of the embryo inside the female body can ... be
seen as a mere unfolding of a potential that is inherent in it," whereas
the in vitro embryo has as much a chance of further development as a
sperm or an egg, which require additional actions for any further pro-
gress to occur. 139 Since embryos donated for research are unwanted
135 Peter Singer & Karen Dawson, IVF Technology and the Argument from
Potential, 17 PHIL. & PuB. AFF. 87 (1988).
136 Id. at 98.
137 Id. at 103.
138 Id. at 89.
139 Id. Singer and Dawson also negate the argument that an embryo is differ-
ent from an egg or a sperm because it is a genetically unique entity that can only
develop into one person. Id. at 95. They separate "potential" from "uniqueness" and
state that the egg "had the potential to become this person all along" and so it cannot
be treated differently from an embryo just because it also has the potential to become
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by their parents, these embryos have a non-existent chance of further
development, and therefore no "potential," unless we decide that
every IVF embryo must be implanted, an unlikely decision.14
0
Quite apart from arguments about the "potential" of an embryo, it
is clear that blastocytes, which yield stem cells, cannot develop into
human beings even if implanted in the uterus, and so have a "zero
probability of becoming a person."' 41 The HHS Fact Sheet, Rabb
Memorandum and NIH guidelines argue that stem cells themselves
are not embryos and so do not fall within any legal and statutory
bans. 42 The logical conclusion of this analysis is that government has
a much diminished interest in preserving the life of an IVF embryo
than it would have in saving the life of a fetus. Since under Roe, the
interest in saving the life of an embryo is almost nonexistent before
viability, again logic dictates that the government interest be declared
minimal when it comes to saving the life of an unimplanted embryo.
A more troubling aspect of this argument is whether in fact a ban
on stem cell research will save the lives of embryos. Large numbers
of unwanted IVF embryos are destroyed every day. 143 Embryos do-
nated to research are unwanted IVF embryos, i.e. the donors of the
other persons. Id. at 96.
140 It is well established that the state may not interfere with individual's
procreative decisions. See Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942) (rejecting,
on equal protection grounds, an Oklahoma statute that required sterilization of certain
repeat criminal offenders, stating that "[m]arriage and procreation are fundamental to
the very existence and survival of the race"); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479,
485-86 (1965) (invalidating a statute restricting use of contraceptives by married
couples, stating that prohibitions on the use of contraceptives unconstitutionally in-
fringe on the sanctity and privacy of the marital relationship); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405
U.S. 438, 453 (1972) (invalidating a statute prohibiting single individuals access to
contraceptives, stating that "[i]f the right of privacy means anything, it is the right of
the individual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion
into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or
beget a child"). Also, lowers courts have repeatedly stated that embryo donors have a
right not to become biological parents of children against their will, and so have
struck down contractual obligations forcing them to donate their embryos for implan-
tation. See notes 147-56 and accompanying text.
141 Singer, supra notel35, at 90.
142 See note 25, and accompanying text.
143 According to the American Society for Reproductive Medicine, a non-
profit professional organization for in vitro fertilization (IVF) clinics, approximately
28,000 IVF babies were born in 1998. Since more embryos are created than are
needed to achieve pregnancy, estimates of frozen embryos which might have been
destroyed by IVF clinics ever since the first IVF baby in 1978 is likely to be in the
hundreds of thousands, compared to perhaps a few dozen that have perished in the
purpose of creating lines of stem cells. See Carl T. Hall, The Forgotten Embryo:
Fertility Clinics Must Store or Destroy the Surplus That Is Part of the Process, SAN
FRANCISCO CHRON., Aug. 20, 2001, at Al (discussing surplus in embryos).
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embryos do not wish to have the embryos implanted, donated for re-
productive purposes, or frozen indefinitely. Prohibiting the donation
of these embryos to research will not save their "lives," nor will it
increase the risk of destruction. To ensure that there is no unneces-
sary loss of embryos and that embryos are not created for the purpose
of research, the research activity could be regulated by allowing only
the informed consent donation of excess embryos created for IVF
purposes. Such a regulation will be closely tailored to state interests
and not unduly intrusive on the research activity. Of course, this regu-
lation already exists. 144  Broadening government interference by
means of an all-out prohibition on either stem cell or embryonic re-
search would hardly be upheld as a narrowly tailored regulation in-
tended to preserve the lives of embryos, nor could it be considered
"no greater than is essential" to the furtherance of the state interest.
Thus it will fail under both strict scrutiny and the O'Brien test. Such a
ban will be hopelessly underinclusive, missing the thousands of em-
bryos destroyed by IVF clinics. It will also be overinclusive, in that it
will stop research that could help the very IVF embryos and fetuses it
is intended to save.
Even more problematic in this context would be prohibition of
federal funding of stem cell research, because such a decision would
push the entire process of isolating and cultivating stem cells from
embryos into the "private" sector, which unlike its public counterpart,
enjoys little ethical or moral oversight. 145
For all the forgoing reasons, it is clear that the Bush decision fails
to achieve the very government interests that are purported to be the
reason for the decision. The asserted governmental interest in regulat-
ing scientific inquiry in this field is neither "compelling" nor "sub-
stantial" enough to outweigh the benefits that could result from con-
tinued research in this filed, and so fails both the strict scrutiny and
the O'Brien tests.
3. Parent's Right to Destroy or Donate Their Embryos
The legal status of IVF embryos is uncertain. Current state stat-
utes, court cases and literature concerning the legal status of embryos
have found frozen IVF embryos to have a status somewhere between
144 See note 33 and accompanying text.
145 See Executive Summary of NBAC Report, supra note 29, at viii (recom-
mending that research on stem cells be subject to national regulatory oversight); NRC
REPORT, supra note 12, at 53 (stating that "the public funding mechanism is the major
means by which NIH influences the type of research performed and the way it is
conducted").
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person and property. They are given more protection than individual
gametes, but do not enjoy the full protection given human beings.
More importantly, the donors of the embryos are given decisional
authority over the fate of their IVF embryos.
Courts in five states have attempted to address the issue of dispo-
sition of IVF embryos. In Davis v. Davis, 46 the divorced mother of
IVF embryos wanted to donate her embryos to an infertile couple,
while her ex-husband wanted them destroyed. The Tennessee Su-
preme Court held that the party seeking to avoid procreation should
prevail, 147 but also stated that had the couple signed an agreement at
the time the embryos were created, that agreement would have been
controlling.
48
In Kass v. Kass,149 a couple underwent ten attempts at IVF. When
the couple divorced, the wife requested sole custody of the frozen
embryos so that she could attempt to become pregnant with them.
The New York Court of Appeals upheld the informed consent agree-
ment which they had both signed, stating that if they were unable to
make a decision about their embryos, the embryos could be used for
research investigations.
1 50
Three subsequent cases have used a seemingly different approach.
Faced with what they considered as legally inadequate agreements
between separated donors of embryos, the Massachusetts Supreme
Court in A.Z. v. B.Z., 151 and the New Jersey Supreme Court in J.B. v.
MB.,152 refused to enforce these agreements if enforcement would
have compelled one donor to become a parent against his or her
will.' 53 Both opinions emphasized that clearly drawn up legal con-
146 842 S.W.2d 588 (Tenn. 1992).
147 Id. at 604.
148 Id. at 597.
149 696 N.E.2d 174 (N.Y. 1998).
ISo Id. at 182.
1'1 725 N.E.2d 1051 (Mass. 2000) (holding that a consent form giving a cou-
ple's frozen pre-embryos to the wife upon the couple's separation was unenforce-
able).
152 783 A.2d 707 (N.J. 2001).
153 In JB., although the agreement indicated that the embryos "will be relin-
quished" to the clinic if the parties divorce, it "carved out an exception" that permit-
ted the parties to obtain a court order directing disposition of the embryos. 783 A.2d
at 713. Therefore, the court reasoned that the "conditional language" employed in the
agreement stood in "sharp contrast ... to the language in the informed consents
provided by the hospital in Kass." Id. In the absence of "a formal, unambiguous
memorialization of the parties' intentions" the court held that the donors had "never
entered into a separate binding contract providing for the disposition of the [frozen
embryos]." Id. at 714.
In AZ., the Massachusetts Supreme Court refused to enforce a pre-implantation
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tracts between donors of IVF embryos would be enforceable if both
agree to the terms, but that in case of disputes, it is against public pol-
icy to "enforce an agreement that would compel one donor to become
a parent against his or her will.'
54
Finally, in Litowitz v. Litowitz, 55 the Washington Court of Ap-
peals held that because a husband and wife's agreement did not say
what should be done with the embryos if the parties disagreed or if
they dissolve their marriage, but instead provided that in such an event
the couple would petition a court for instructions concerning the ap-
propriate disposition of their embryos, there was no express agree-
ment to enforce.156 This case, however, is distinguishable because the
wife was not the donor of the eggs (a surrogate egg donor had pro-
vided the eggs for the IVF embryos). Nevertheless, the court again
emphasized the position that the husband, as the sperm donor, "has
the constitutional right to dispose of the preembryos as he chooses"
and that he is "not obligated to formulate a feasible plan or even a
plan that would potentially bring the preembryos to life."' 157
These cases demonstrate that legally, embryos do not enjoy the
full protection of the state. It is now a legally accepted practice for
parents of IVF embryos to sign directives regarding the fate of their
embryos, choosing whether they wish to destroy their embryos, do-
nate them for research, store them, or donate them to another couple
for implantation. Once again, the state should not be able to ban the
donation of unwanted embryos for research, any more than it should
require that all embryos be implanted. 58  This argument becomes
even more compelling when it is seen in the context of organ trans-
plantation. Parents are allowed to donate their own organs to save a
child or a close family member. A government ban on stem cell re-
search is similar to a ban on such organ donation, because it means
agreement signed by the husband and wife which stated that in the event of "separa-
tion", the frozen pre-embryos would be given to the wife for implantation. 725
N.E.2d at 1056-59. Although the case departed from the previous decisions to en-
force prior agreements, the court's reasoning was premised on the fact that (1) it was
"dubious at best that [the agreement] represent[ed] the intent of the husband and the
wife regarding disposition of the preembryos in the case of a dispute between them,"
and (2) it was against public policy to "enforce an agreement that would compel one
donor to become a parent against his or her will." Id. at 1056-57. So these opinions
did not so much consider prior agreements per se unenforceable as they refused to
compel the donor of an embryo to parent a child against his or her wish.
' See 783 A.2d at 717; A.Z., 725 N.E.2d at 1057.
... 10 P.3d 1086 (Wash. Ct. App. 2000), rev'd 48 P.3d 261 (Wash. 2002).
156 Id. at 1091.
117 Id. at 1093.
158 See note 140 and accompanying text.
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that parents would not be able to donate an unwanted embryo towards
research that could potentially benefit the same child or close family
member. If the embryo's fate belongs to the parents, the state should
not stand in the way of their decision, particularly if the health of an-
other person hangs in the balance.
Whatever level of protection scientific inquiry should enjoy, it is
undisputed that any direct government interference with such inquiry
should not be taken lightly. Freedom of inquiry, at the very least,
means "freedom from government interference in the scientist's
choice of ends or means in research, so that a scientist is permitted to
do what he is otherwise capable of doing."
159
IV. GOVERNMENT'S FUNDING DECISIONS
A. The Problem of Positive Rights and Requiring State Funding
The government's responsibility for the welfare of its citizens has
never been construed as imposing a positive duty on government to
subsidize welfare activities. Nor does the right to freedom of speech
impose a duty to fund all speech or speech related activities. Consti-
tutional liberties are concerned with negative rather than positive
freedoms, mandating only that the government not act to interfere
with the exercise of such rights. The Court has repeatedly held that
"the Due Process Clauses generally confer no affirmative right to
governmental aid, even where such aid may be necessary to secure
life, liberty, or property interests of which the government itself may
not deprive the individual."' 160 In other words, "[t]he government has
no constitutional duty to subsidize an activity merely because the ac-
tivity is constitutionally protected."'
16
'
In the context of stem cell research, there are many valid policy
reasons why scientists want to urge the government to support their
research. At this moment, enormous amounts of basic research are
needed to answer scientists' many questions about stem cells.'
62
Since World War II, basic research has been the traditional domain of
public funding, and many academic and other non-profit institutions
159 Robertson, supra note 53, at 1206.
160 Webster v. Reprod. Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 507 (1989) (quoting
DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 196 (1989)).
Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 201 (1991).
162 "Basic research is defined as the a systematic study directed toward greater
knowledge or understanding of the fundamental aspects of phenomena and of observ-
able facts without specific applications, processes, or products in mind." NRC
REPORT, supra note 12, at 48.
[Vol. 13:181
THE STEM CELL COMPROMISE
have become dependent upon a continuation of this support. Public
funding optimizes opportunities for scientific advances in several
ways. First, private for-profit companies focus their research invest-
ments on products-related applications, such as new drugs, diagnostic
tools, and medical devices that cure, detect, or prevent disease. Ac-
cording to experts in the field, "[a]bsent public funding ... even fis-
cally conservative economists tend to agree that socially optimal lev-
els of basic research will not be pursued." 163 Second, prohibition on
federal funding of stem cell research would limit progress by limiting
the number of scientists who participate in the research. "NIH can
revoke a scientist's funding for violating federally imposed restric-
tions," such as mixing private and public funding in research areas
subject to federal restrictions. 164 Because research on human stem
cells is in its infancy, many private companies may not be willing to
fund such research. It is easy, therefore, to conclude that certain re-
search will not be performed at all unless it is supported by the gov-
ernment, and to move from this conclusion to the proposition that
government's refusal to provide support is tantamount to suppression
of the research. 165 If the government has a constitutional obligation to
protect the health'and welfare of its people, such suppression will
breach that obligation.
Although scientists can formulate policy arguments against this
type of government action, they will not be successful in mounting a
legal challenge to government's decision not to fund a certain area of
research. As a general proposition, there are few constitutional con-
straints upon the power of the government to spend money as it sees
fit, and even fewer on the government's power not to spend money.
The government has full discretion to base its funding decisions on
broad public policy considerations, and such decisions will be upheld
unless its spending or not spending runs afoul of some specific consti-
tutional protection. 166  For example, the Constitution would not be
163 Id. at 50.
164 id.
165 See Katherine Bouton, Academic Research and Big Business: A Delicate
Balance, N.Y. TIMEs, September 11, 1983, § 6 (magazine), at 62 (discussing the view
that failure to fund research amounts to government restrictions on that research). For
a similar argument see Rust, 500 U.S. at 192, 201 where opponents of a government
regulation that prohibited counselors in Title X-funded family planning clinics from
engaging in abortion-encouraging speech argued that these restrictions amounted to
suppression of the clinic staff's and the patient's first amendment right to free speech,
and a woman's constitutional right to obtain an abortion.
166 The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that the government is free to
provide resources for some speech while denying support for other speech. See, e.g.,
Rust, 500 U.S. at 194 (holding that the government may selectively fund public pro-
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violated if the government refused to fund a research project because
it thought that the resultant knowledge would be harmful. 167 Espe-
cially since not every area of research that every scientist wishes to
conduct can be supported, government must and should select those
projects that it believes have the most merit. 168
The problem with this type of "negative rights" argument in the
area of basic science research is that it presupposes that "a scientist
whose heart is set on doing a piece of science remains free, subject to
possible national security exceptions ... to do it without government
funding."' 169 As the analysis in the next section will reveal, this pre-
sumption is false because by selecting the areas of research it wants to
fund and making only private funds available, the government se-
verely restricts scientists' freedom to conduct their research. More-
over, despite the almost free hand that the government enjoys in mak-
grams to encourage certain activities it believes to be in the public interest as well as
define the limits of those programs); Regan v. Taxation With Representation of
Washington, 461 U.S. 540 (1983) (Congress has the authority to determine the best
way to spend federal money and in doing so may decide to award a tax benefit to
some charitable organizations and not to others); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976)
(a legislature's decision not to subsidize the exercise of a fundamental right does not
infringe that right). See also Gary A. Winters, Note, Unconstitutional Conditions as
"Non-subsidies": When Is Deference Inappropriate, 80 GEO. L. J. 131 (1991) (noting
recent Supreme Court decisions' deference to government spending decisions).
167 See Valerie M. Fogleman, Regulating Science: An Evaluation of the Regu-
lation of Biotechnology Research, 17 ENVTL. L. 183, 187-88 (1987). In the case of
biotechnology experimentation, Fogelman states:
[T]he state has a legitimate interest in protecting the environment, public
health, and safety. This state interest should be "sufficiently important" to
justify regulating the nonspeech element of experimentation. If regulations
were narrowly drafted to address only safety measures, a rational basis for
the regulations would probably be sufficient. If regulations were suppress-
ing knowledge, however, the state would probably be required to show a
compelling interest for the regulation.
While a problem is raised by content-based regulations aimed specifically at
biotechnology research, regulations directed solely at potential dangers of
noncommunicative aspects of experimentation - the release of novel organ-
isms into the environment - should rest on solid constitutional ground.
Such regulations would merely limit the time, manner, and place of experi-
ments.
As long as regulations on biotechnology experiments do not seek to prohibit
experiments in the guise of regulating them, the regulations should with-
stand constitutional scrutiny.
168 See Robertson, supra note 53, at 1279 (stating that government has "the
power to condition research expenditures on the pursuit of certain ends by methods
that will maximize interests other than pure science and interests other than those the
scientist himself might choose").
169 Harold P. Green, Constitutional Implications of Federal Restrictions on
Scientific Research and Communication, 60 UMKC L. REv. 619, 625 (1992).
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ing its funding decisions, such decisions may be challenged on other
grounds if they infringe on constitutional rights.
B. Can Government Condition Its Funding?
Even if the Constitution imposes no obligation on the states to
provide benefits, or to fund particular biomedical research, when gov-
ernment does decide to fund such research, the manner in which it
dispenses the benefits is subject to scrutiny.
First, government may not distribute benefits completely arbitrar-
ily or at its discretion, but has to satisfy at least a test of minimal ra-
tionality. 170 Minimal rationality is applied only when the recipient's
constitutional rights are not implicated.' 71 This means that govern-
ment's classifications of recipients of benefits should implicate neither
suspect classes of persons nor fundamental constitutional liberties,
and will be valid only upon a showing that the government's distribu-
tional criteria are rationally related to a legitimate governmental ob-
jective.' 72
At the other end of the spectrum, if government classifies recipi-
ents of benefits according to their immutable characteristics, the Su-
preme Court will analyze the decision on equal protection grounds. 173
170 Kathleen M. Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 HARV. L. REV.
1413, 1425 (1989).
171 See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 17 (1973)
(stating that if no fundamental right or discrimination on the basis of suspect classifi-
cations is implicated, a legislative scheme "must still be examined to determine
whether it rationally further some legitimate, articulated state purpose").
172 Recent examples of government actions, where the Court has only re-
quired a "rational basis" for its review of government's classifications include: Lyng
v. Castillo, 477 U.S. 635, 638-39 (1986) (discussing distinction in food stamp pro-
gram between households of one family and households with separate economic
units); New York City Transit Auth. v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568 (1979) (concerning
regulation of public employment based on history of narcotics use, including metha-
done); Califano v. Jobst, 434 U.S. 47, 53-57 (1977) (basing social security disability
payments on the eligibility of the recipient's spouse); Dandridge v. Williams, 397
U.S. 471, 485 (1970) (involving a state regulation setting ceiling on grants that treat
families of different sizes unequally).
173 See Winters, supra note 166, at 137. See also Lynn Baker, The Prices of
Rights: Toward a Positive Theory of Unconstitutional Conditions, 75 CORNELL L.
REv. 1185, 1189-90 (1990) (classifying conditions into two groups: those that present
a choice of actions and those that automatically disqualify people who possess some
immutable characteristic). The Bush plan may be challenged on equal protection
grounds because it effectively deprives some populations, e.g. African-Americans,
from being represented in the pool of stem cells available for research. Because ge-
netically diverse cells react differently to experimental procedures, it may be neces-
sary to conduct research on stem cells derived from donors of diverse ethnicity.
Unless the 64 stem cell lines in the NIH registry includes these ethnic groups, the plan
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The Court will employ "strict scrutiny" when the classification in-
volves "suspect" groups, such as those based on race, 74 "rational ba-
sis" review when the classification does not involve a "suspect"
group, such as the mentally retarded 175 or the elderly, 76 and "inter-
mediate" scrutiny when the classification involves an in-between dis-
tinction, such as sex.
177
A third category of scrutiny is used when a benefit is offered on
condition that the recipients forgo a constitutional right or perform an
activity that a constitutional right normally protects.' 78  In other
words, "[i]f the classification denies or provides a lesser benefit to
some on the basis of [how they exercise their] choice within their re-
spective zones of autonomy (that is, within areas of protected rights),
the focus of traditional analysis shifts to the impact of the classifica-
tion on the right involved."' 179 Such decisions are subject to stricter
scrutiny and give rise to the doctrine of "unconstitutional conditions."
This section will examine the Bush plan in the context of this doc-
trine. It will argue that because the plan conditions federal funding on
scientists' acceptance to work on a handful of cells, it restricts their
freedom to carry out scientific inquiry within prescribed legal bounds.
Furthermore, the Bush plan eliminates most private interest in devel-
opment of new stem cells, in effect strangulating the research in its
infancy and foreclosing the possibility of future development in this
area. Lastly, it argues that the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions
is particularly applicable in this case, because the government is try-
ing to achieve an end through the back door that it could not achieve
directly, and because the danger of government overreaching is
strongest when through its monopoly power it controls the playing
field.
is discriminatory against those who are not represented in the pool of cells available.
However, full discussion of this issue is beyond the scope of this note.
174 See Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (holding that laws
segregating public schools by race are unconstitutional under the Equal Protection
Clause).
175 See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 446
(1985) (requiring only rational basis review of classification based on status as men-
tally retarded).
176 See, e.g., Mass. Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 314 (1976)
(per curiam) (holding that a law requiring state police officers to retire at age 50 must
be rationally related to legitimate state interests).
177 See, e.g., Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718 (1982) (stating
that classification barring men from state nursing schools demands less than highest
level of scrutiny under Equal Protection Clause).
178 Sullivan, supra note 170, at 1421-22.
179 Winters, supra note 166, at 138 (emphasis added).
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C. The Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine Meets the Bush Plan
The doctrine of unconstitutional conditions seeks to distinguish
between government's undoubtedly broad power to decide which ac-
tivities to subsidize, or otherwise encourage, and the government's
considerably narrower power to decide which activities to penalize or
otherwise discourage, whether directly or by attaching conditions to
its benefits. 18 ° Even though the court has recognized in numerous
cases that certain conditions placed on benefits amount to an unconsti-
tutional restriction on the exercise of a fundamental right, 181 the his-
tory of the doctrine's development has been an uneasy one, and the
issues it sets out to resolve "implicate a troubled area of our jurispru-
dence."'
82
The question the doctrine strains to resolve is to what extent can
government attach an otherwise unconstitutional condition to the re-
ceipt of public funds. 183 Put another way, when is burdening the exer-
cise of a fundamental right to be considered an infringement of that
right, requiring the application of strict scrutiny? To qualify for strict
scrutiny, the government benefit must be one that is permitted but not
compelled. 184 Also, not all constitutional rights are implicated in the
unconstitutional conditions cases. The doctrine only protects "rights
that depend on some sort of exercise of autonomous choice by the
rightholder.' 8 5  Moreover, the decision that the beneficiary has to
make must involve "future action." 186 Once all these requirements are
180 See TRIBE, supra note 99, at § 11-15, at 781.
181 For analysis of the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions, see generally
Sullivan, supra note 170; Richard A. Epstein, Unconstitutional Conditions, State
Power, and the Limits of Consent, 102 HARv. L. REv. 5 (1988); Seth Kreimer, Allo-
cational Sanctions: The Problem of Negative Rights in a Positive State, 132 U. PA. L.
REv. 1293 (1984).
182 Rust, 500 U.S. at 205 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). J. Blackmun quotes
Epstein, supra note 181, at 6 (describing this problem as "the basic structural issue
that for over a hundred years has bedeviled courts and commentators alike"), and
Sullivan, supra note 170, at 1415-16 (observing that this Court's unconstitutional
conditions cases "seem a minefield to be traversed gingerly").
183 Rust, 500 U.S. at 205.
184 Sullivan, supra note 170, at 1422.
i85 Id. at 1426. Sullivan explains that the "The doctrine is not triggered, for
example, by classification on the basis of unalterable characteristics such as race or
sex or the marital status of one's parents at the time of birth. Such classifications are
often unconstitutional, but not on the ground that they impose unconstitutional condi-
tions. Persons on the wrong side of an unalterable-characteristic line are not hurt by
any pressure to opt into the benefited class." Id.
186 Id. at 1427.
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met, such conditioned benefits should be "subject to the same demand
for especially strong justification as direct burdens on the right."'187
In the context of stem cell research, the government condition at
issue is that researchers who want federal funding must limit their
research to the 64 or so cells available on the NIH registry. This con-
dition qualifies for strict scrutiny by the courts because it meets the
above criteria. The government's funding of stem cell research was
not compelled but discretionary, and the condition attached to the
benefit impinges on scientists' autonomous right to choose how to
conduct their research within legal boundaries. Stem cell research has
not been banned, and as mentioned earlier, a direct restriction of this
research could meet with a serious constitutional challenge. More-
over, a restriction could only be implemented by Congress, not the
president. Therefore, if a condition placed on recipients of govern-
ment funding amounts to an impermissible restriction on researchers'
ability to perform stem cell research, government would have
achieved indirectly what it could not do directly. Under the unconsti-
tutional conditions doctrine, the government decision would be sub-
ject to strict scrutiny and would only be upheld in the face of a sub-
stantial governmental interest.
1. The Coercion/Non-Subsidy Debate
The Court has often cited coercion as the reason for striking down
conditions that affect individual rights such as freedom of speech,
religion and association. In this context, a coercive condition is one
that "deters" the exercise of a constitutional right or "penalizes" a
person for exercising their right. Most notable are the three seminal
cases that extended the unconstitutional conditions doctrine to cover
speech and religion. In Speiser v. Randall,1 88 the Court invalidated a
state requirement that World War II veterans take a loyalty oath as a
condition of receiving veteran's property-tax exemption, because "[t]o
deny an exemption to claimants who engage in certain forms of
speech is in effect to penalize them for such speech."'' 89 In Sherbert v.
Verner,190 the Court invalidated a denial of state unemployment bene-
fits to a woman who would not work on Saturdays because it was her
Sabbath. The Court characterized the condition on the benefit as co-
ercive and an impermissible government imposition on Sherbert's free
187 Id. at 1428.
188 357 U.S. 513 (1958).
i9 Id. at 518.
190 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
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exercise of religion.191 Finally in Shapiro v. Thompson,192 the Court,
citing Sherbert, ruled that denying welfare benefits to those residents
who had lived in-state for less than one year penalized the fundamen-
tal right to interstate travel. 93 In other words, government cannot use
its power to dispense benefits to "produce a result which [it] could not
command directly."' 94 This traditional approach relies on the idea that
the offer of a benefit in return for relinquishment of a constitutional
right "coerces" the recipient or "penalizes" the exercise of his rights, a
result which cannot be justified by simply appealing to the discretion-
ary nature of the benefit.
It is undeniable that the condition attached to the federal funding
of stem cell research pressures researchers to agree not to work on
any novel stem cells however desirable or better these cells may be.
Given the choice, researchers would not choose to limit themselves to
whatever technology was available up until August 2001. However,
we must determine whether this type of pressure exerted by the gov-
ernment amounts to "coercion" of researchers. Unfortunately, the
Supreme Court cases do not provide a clear test. The seminal case of
Perry v. Sindermann195 took an expansive approach to the doctrine:
For at least a quarter-century, this Court has made clear that
even though a person has no "right" to a valuable governmen-
tal benefit and even though the government may deny him the
benefit for any number of reasons, there are some reasons
upon which the government may not rely. It may not deny a
benefit to a person on a basis that infringes his constitution-
ally protected interests... 196
More recently, however, the Court has changed its characterization of
conditions that pressure the recipients into a choice that government
approves of as mere "non-subsidies" rather than "coercion."
'9' See id. at 404.
192 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
193 id.
194 Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 526 (1958) (instructing that indirect
violations of constitutional guarantees are as violative as direct infringements). See
also Sullivan, supra note 170, at 1415 (stating that the doctrine of unconstitutional
conditions "reflects ... the view that government may not do indirectly what it may
not do directly").
195 408 U.S. 593 (1972) (holding that a non-renewal of an employment con-
tract may violate the employee's Constitutional free speech rights, even if he lacked
"a contractual or tenure right to re-employment").
'96 Id. at 597.
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The most troubling cases where the court used the "non-subsidy"
argument are three abortion-funding decisions. The first two cases
involve Fifth Amendment due process rights. In Maher v. Roe,197 the
Court upheld a Connecticut welfare regulation that excluded
nontherapeutic abortions from a Medicaid program that subsidized
medical expenses incidental to pregnancy and childbirth. The Court
held that the regulation "places no obstacles - absolute or otherwise -
in the pregnant woman's path to an abortion."' 198 Then in analyzing
the state interest, it concluded that a state could make a value judg-
ment favoring childbirth over abortion, and to implement that judg-
ment by the allocation of public funds. '99 Three justices dissented,
criticizing the Court for not recognizing the effect of the regulation
and the fact that "[t]his disparity in funding by the State clearly oper-
ates to coerce indigent pregnant women., 200 They held that such un-
due burdening of "the fundamental right of a pregnant woman to be
free to choose to have an abortion" was not constitutional because the
sate had advanced no compelling interest.201
Later, in a 5 to 4 decision in Harris v. McRae,20 2 the Court held
that the Hyde Amendment, which denies federal funding for medically
necessary abortions, does not impinge on a woman's Fifth Amend-
ment due process right to decide whether to terminate a pregnancy.
The Court found no government attempt to penalize or coerce a Medi-
caid-eligible woman's decision whether to terminate her pregnancy.
Instead, it characterized the government decision as merely an "un-
equal subsidization . . . [that] encourages alternative activity. 2 3
Again the Court emphasized that "[t]he Hyde Amendment, like the
Connecticut welfare regulation at issue in Maher, places no govern-
mental obstacle in the path of a woman who chooses to terminate her
pregnancy."2 0'4 Four justices wrote strong dissenting opinions chiding
the Court for not recognizing that the Hyde Amendment is a transpar-
ent attempt by the legislators to deny indigent women the exercise of
their constitutionally protected right recognized in Roe v. Wade, even
if such a denial results in serious and permanent injury to the health of
the mother.20 5 The dissenting Justices all argued that: (a) the denial
'9' 432 U.S. 464 (1977).
198 Id. at 474.
199 Id.
200 Id. at 483 (Brennan, J., Marshall, J., Blackmun, J., dissenting).
201 Id. at 489 (Brennan, J., Marshall, J., Blackmun, J., dissenting).
202 448 U.S. 297 (1980).
203 Id. at 315.
204 Id.
205 Id. at 332 (Brennan, J., dissenting). See also id. at 346-47 (Marshall, J.,
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of funding by the federal government and the state is tantamount to
coercing poor women not to exercise their constitutionally protected
right to decide to have an abortion, that denying a state benefit in this
instance was the same as imposing a penalty or ban;20 6 and (b) that
Roe v. Wade made clear that the state interest in protecting fetal life
cannot justify jeopardizing the life or health of the mother.2 °7
The last abortion funding case implicated First Amendment rights
of health care workers. In Rust v. Sullivan,208 another 5 to 4 decision,
the Court held that a Department of Health and Human Services regu-
lation that prohibited Title X family planning projects from engaging
in counseling, referral for, or advocating abortion was constitutional.
Refusing to apply the unconstitutional conditions doctrine, the Court
again resorted to the now familiar argument that a "legislature's deci-
sion not to subsidize the exercise of a fundamental right does not in-
fringe the right. 20 9
The problem with the Court's reasoning in these cases is that it
assumes that there is still a private market to which those who were
denied a benefit could turn. Both majority opinions in Maher and
Harris stressed two factors in their analysis of the effect of the abor-
tion funding regulations. First, they insisted that the women who
dissenting) (describing the refusal of the legislature to approve payment for abortions
as the equivalent of an outright prohibition for indigent women); id. at 348 (Black-
mun, J., dissenting) (faulting the majority for punishing a small group of women by
imposing their own concepts of morality); id at 354 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting
the serious harm that could befall a woman requiring a medically necessary abortion).
206 In Justice Brennan's dissenting opinion, in which Justices Marshall and
Blackmun joined, he writes:
The fundamental flaw in the Court's due process analysis ... is its failure
to acknowledge that the discriminatory distribution of the benefits of gov-
ernmental largesse can discourage the exercise of fundamental liberties just
as effectively as can an outright denial of those rights through criminal and
regulatory sanctions. Implicit in the Court's reasoning is the notion that as
long as the Government is not obligated to provide its citizens with certain
benefits or privileges, it may condition the grant of such benefits on the re-
cipient's relinquishment of his constitutional rights.
448 U.S. at 334.
207 Id. at 351 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Roe, 410 U.S. at 165). In
addition, two justices also argued that the Amendment constituted an equal protection
violation because it "[excluded a woman] from a benefit that is available to all others
similarly situated" based on the woman's decision to exercise her fundamental right.
Id. at 345 (Marshall, J., dissenting). See also id. at 350-53 (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(pointing to exclusion of some women who are forced to decide between their health
and abortion).
208 500 U.S. 173, 203 (1991).
209 Id. at 193 (quoting Regan v. Taxation with Representation of Wash., 461
U.S. at 549)
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were denied benefits did not suffer a "disadvantage" as a consequence
of the state regulation because the state had imposed "no governmen-
tal restriction on access" to privately funded abortions.21 ° Second, the
reason for the women's dependency on the government funding, i.e.,
their indigency, was not created by the state. 211 As a result, they rea-
soned, government's denial of funding "leaves an indigent woman
with at least the same range of choice[s] in deciding whether to obtain
a medically necessary abortion as she would have had if Congress had
chosen to subsidize no health care costs at all. 212 The Court would
have applied strict scrutiny had the state "denied general welfare
benefits to all women who had obtained abortions and who were oth-
erwise entitled to the benefits.' 213 Similarly, in Rust, the Court re-
peated the argument that "[t]he difficulty that a woman encounters
when a Title X project does not provide abortion counseling or refer-
ral leaves her in no different position than she would have been if the
Government had not enacted Title X.
214
The next section will illustrate that unlike the aforementioned
cases, the Court's presumption does not apply to the Bush plan, be-
cause the condition that the Bush plan imposes does restrict scientists'
access to alternative funds, and so leaves scientists in a worse position
that if the condition had not been imposed. Additionally, it affects
scientists who do not choose to apply for federal funding but who
work in institutions who do. This combination of effects is more pro-
found that the effect of previously upheld conditions and calls for
stricter scrutiny.
2. The effect of the Bush Plan
The NIH "is the largest federal sponsor of health research, with a
budget of more than $20 billion in FY200. 21 5 Although pharmaceu-
tical and biotechnology firms match those levels of funding, NIH re-
mains the primary sponsor of basic biomedical research. NIH spent an
estimated 62% of its 1996 budget on basic research, as compared to
the mere 14% of all the private sector pharmaceutical R&D spent on
basic research.216 Private sector efforts are dominated by for-profit
companies that focus their research investments on product-related
210 Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S 464, 474 (1977), Harris, 448 U.S. at 315.
211 Maher, 432 U.S. at 474; Harris, 448 U.S. at 316.
212 Harris, 448 U.S. at 317.
213 Maher, 432 U.S. at 474 n.8. Accord Harris, 448 U.S. at 317 n.19.
214 Rust, 500 U.S. at 202.
215 NRC REPORT, supra note 12, at 49.
216 NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, TRENDS IN FEDERAL SUPPORT OF
RESEARCH AND GRADUATE EDUCATION 81 (Stephen A. Merrill ed., 2001).
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applications, such as new drugs or diagnostic tools. Even so, in the
field of embryonic research, private companies have come to the fore
because of the ban on federal funding of basic science research on
embryos.
Before August 9, the government's near monopoly of basic re-
search funding did not extend to stem cell research. Because isolation
of stem cells involved embryos, the initial steps of the research had to
be funded by private companies. One company, Geron, pioneered the
way in providing private funds for stem cell research, funding the
work of James Thomson at University of Wisconsin, Roger Pederson
at the University of California, San Francisco, and John Gearhart at
the Johns Hopkins University School of Medicine.21 7 The stem cell
lines developed by James Thomson are the most famous cells avail-
able on the NIH registry, not only because Thomson was the first to
pioneer successful "immortalization" of human embryonic stem cells
in the United States, but because his institute, WiCell, owns the patent
on these cells.218
After the Presidential Statement of August 9, 2001, NIH negoti-
ated a Memorandum of Understanding between WiCell and Public
Health Services ("WiCell Agreement"), which applies to all research
institutes who opt to receive WiCell stem cells. 219 The main aim of
the agreement was to facilitate the transfer of stem cells from WiCell
to researchers.
The WiCell Agreement makes it clear that once a researcher re-
ceives stem cells from WiCell, it will not be able to conduct research
on other cells which do not meet the criteria set out in the Presidential
Statement of August 9, 2001 .220 Additionally, the agreement requires
that researchers not receive stem cells from other sources under terms
more "onerous" to the researchers (i.e., more advantageous to the
22 1source) than those provided in the WiCell Agreement. Accord-
ingly, under the terms of the WiCell Agreement, any researcher who
receives federal funding to conduct research on WiCell stem cell lines
217 See Nelle S. Paegel, Note, Use of Stem Cells in Biotechnological Re-
search, 22 WHITrER L. REV. 1183, 1189 (2001) (noting, however, that "private re-
search is [often] hindered by economic constraints").
21 See NIH NEW RELEASE, supra note 4 and accompanying text (explaining
the origin of WiCell).
219 U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Memorandum of Under-
standing Between WiCell Research Institute, Inc. and Public Health Service, [herein-
after WiCell Agreement], available at
http://www.nih.gov/news/stemcell/WiCellMou.pdf (Sept. 5, 2001).
220 Id. at § (1)(b).
221 Id. at § (1)(c).
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will not be able to use stem cells derived from other private sources."'
It seems most likely that the other sources of NIH approved stem cells
would sign similar MOU's.
Another obstacle to researcher's use of private funds for stem cell
research is the arrangements under which federal funds are made
available. NIH agrees to provide "direct" and "indirect" funds to NIH
approved research activities.223 Direct funds cover such costs as spe-
cific equipment, laboratory and personnel salaries that are incurred as
a direct result of the research. Indirect costs, also called facilities and
administration costs, partially cover shared laboratory and personnel
facilities and general running costs of the funded institute. Therefore,
although indirect funds must be accounted for, they go to a shared
pool of funds that may be used for non-federally funded activities.
However, if there is a specified ban on the use of federal funds for
certain activities, e.g., embryonic research or stem cell research in-
volving non-federally approved stem cell lines, the indirect funds may
not be used in a common pool and much stricter accounting is re-
quired to ensure total separation of all federal funds from private mon-
ies. Many institutions may not be able to meet these stricter stan-
dards.
So, given the fact that federal government is by far the greatest
player in the field of funding for basic biomedical research, its entry
into the area of stem cell research has dramatically altered the previ-
ous balance. Because of the way NIH funds are managed, and be-
cause of the agreement between WiCell and stem cell recipients, the
moment a researcher decides to use federal funds for stem cell re-
search, she, and her entire institution, are foreclosed from using any
private funds to conduct research on newly developed stem cells.
3. Why the Non-Subsidy Argument Fails
The Court's non-subsidy argument will not save the unconstitu-
tionality of a condition in a situation where an "alternative" private
source of funding may become significantly diminished in the face of
government monopoly. By shutting down private capital's enthusi-
asm for innovative work on new stem cells, there will be little alterna-
tive to the government plan and almost all researchers will be forced
to accept the federal funding condition. Moreover, any further devel-
opment in derivation of better stem cells from embryos will be halted.
222 For other restrictive clauses in the contract, such as patent and licensing
rights see id at §§ (1)(a), (2)(d).
223 See NIH GRANTs POLICY STATEMENT (specifying the guidelines for grant
applications for various entities), at http://grantsI.nih.gov/grants/policy/nihgps_2001.
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As mentioned earlier,224 even though the available stem cells are theo-
retically "immortal," every division of the cells carries a risk of accu-
mulating genetic mutations, turning the cells into dangerous "junk"
cells with no therapeutic merit. Researchers who would normally
watch out for new discoveries would only be able to watch from the
side lines, because they would not be able to use the fruits of any new
research. This situation, arguably, is worse than the status quo before
the Bush Plan, because before August 2001, there was no restriction
on how private funds were used. The government here has cleverly
maneuvered itself into the field of stem cell research and although on
its face has not banned or restricted the activity, in essence has
stopped its growth.
So, unlike the regulations in Maher, Harris, or Rust, the Bush
plan does restrict a researcher's access to private funds if she chooses
to work on the federally approved stem cells, and therefore puts her at
more of a "disadvantage" than if government had decided either to
fund, or not to fund, all stem cell research. Furthermore, this disad-
vantage is the direct result of state action.
4. The Concept of Free Choice in an Area of Government Monopoly
Another often cited criticism of equating government's rights-
pressuring conditions with coercion is that the beneficiary has the
apparent free will to accept or reject the benefit, thus exercising her
free choice. This criticism of the doctrine takes a broad view of free
choice, arguing that the beneficiary of the benefit exercised his free
will and bargained for the burden on his constitutional rights.225 For
example, it is clear that the Maher-Harris analysis only applies to
those who choose to accept the government's offer of benefits, even if
it means forgoing their right. Similarly, in Rust, the Court stated that
the staff of Title X clinics were individuals who were "voluntarily
employed for a Title X project," who must therefore "perform their
duties in accordance with the regulation's restrictions.'226 This argu-
ment is premised on the fact that there is nothing unconstitutional
about individuals voluntarily forgoing their rights to receive funds.
But the Bush plan affects those who neither consent to the condi-
tion, nor seek federal funding. These individuals will nevertheless be
affected because they either work in the same institution as those who
have federal funding, or because they are faced with a market depleted
of private capital. If government had merely decided not to fund any
224 See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
225 See Sullivan, supra note 170, at 1417.
226 Rust, 500 U.S. at 198.
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stem cell research, indirect money from federal grants could be used
as a general indirect support for researchers wanting to conduct stem
cell research. To illustrate, assume researcher P wants to use private
funds to work on stem cells and researcher F has a federal grant. Be-
fore the Bush plan, they could work in the same laboratory, using the
same "general consumables," without researcher F losing her grant, or
exposing the institute to liability for breaking a federal law, as long as
federal funds were not used to directly support researcher P's activi-
ties. After the implementation of the Bush plan, however, if re-
searcher F decides to apply for an NIH grant to work on the approved
64 stem cell-lines, he cannot share his equipment with researcher P.
Researcher P, therefore, will have to either stop her work, or come up
with enough funding to set up a physically separate laboratory facility,
complete with equipment, support staff, etc. Researcher P will be
drastically affected by the new plan, despite not being a party to re-
searcher F's decision to apply for federal funding. In fact, the plan
will affect the entire institution in which researcher F works.
Moreover, this view of "free choice" does not take into account
the realities of the current marketplace. Free choice is only meaning-
ful when there are alternatives one can choose from. Since the Bush
plan serves to aggrandize an already existing government monopoly
in the area of funding for stem cell research, "freedom" to exercise
one's "choice" becomes meaningless.
To explain the unconstitutional conditions doctrine, one must rec-
ognize that coercion is possible even in the absence of force, fraud, or
criminal sanctions, and even in an apparently consensual bargain.227
The most obvious paradigm case is when the government, as the ne-
gotiating party, holds a monopoly in a certain area of funding.228 The
doctrine has been applied to cases where the state demanded release
of constitutional rights as the price of access to monopolized bene-
227 Sullivan, supra note 170, at 1420. See also Epstein, supra note 181, at 16-
21 (discussing perfect competition, monopoly, collective action problems, and the
possibilities for coercion); Winters, supra note 166, at 142.
228 See Winters, supra note 166. Winters argues that we should change our
conception of government because the traditional public-private distinction has col-
lapsed. Id. at 156-57. This is because when government funding dominates an areas
(e.g. family planning or providing for indigent women's medical expenses), it sub-
stantially alters the availability of private alternatives in that area. So the government,
by choosing to fund only one particular view point, effectively creates a "monopoly"
in that area. Id. at 159-60. Therefore, he argues that at least in the area of First
Amendment rights, when "government subsidies have the effect of monopolizing an
entire subject area of speech... the Court should demand a higher justification when
the government attempts to withdraw its subsidization of one of those viewpoints."
Id. at 160.
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fits. 229 Prominent commentators in this field warn that it is precisely
when government power reaches monopoly levels that the doctrine
becomes most important in keeping a check on how government uses
its power.
Richard Epstein examines the bargaining process between gov-
ernment and beneficiaries in light of the function and the limitations
of consent. He argues that "whenever the government enters the mar-
ket as an ordinary contracting party... the traditional norms prohibit-
ing coercion and duress are insufficient to police the legal monopoly
that government exercises over certain critical domains.2 3 ° He ar-
gues that because the Court has given the state more latitude in recent
years, the arguments that the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions
should come to the fore are even more compelling. To him, the ideal
situation would have been a direct constitutional restriction on gov-
ernment powers that skew the market; "if the Court had restricted the
scope of the government power in the first instance," the doctrine's
application would be unnecessary. 231 Absent such substantive limita-
tions, the doctrine is a "second best" effort to reign in the broad pow-
ers conferred upon government officials.232
Sullivan argues, quoting Charles Reich, that the principal concern
with the state's power over beneficiaries of government largesse is the
229 See for example cases which deal with the state's demand of release of
constitutional rights in order to gain access to public highways. See, e.g., Frost &
Frost Trucking Co. v. R.R. Comm'n of Cal., 271 U.S. 583 (1926) (holding that Cali-
fornia could exclude private carriers from the use of its highways altogether, but it
could not condition entry to the highways upon the private carriers' willingness to
assume the burdens of a common carrier).
230 Epstein, supra note 181, at 16-21. Epstein analyzes the doctrine of Uncon-
stitutional Conditions in the following way: "When the government uses only its
monopoly of force to achieve its ends, classic constitutional questions arise under
particular constitutional provisions. But when the government uses its power to con-
tract or grant, then the issue of unconstitutional conditions proper is raised." Id. at
102.
231 Epstein, supra note 181, at 28.232 Id. Epstein states:
The doctrine of unconstitutional conditions is also beset with the serious
problem of being a 'second best' approach to controlling government dis-
cretion. In many cases, the Supreme Court has held that Congress or the
states have absolute discretion with regard to [many] matters. This discre-
tion increases the risks associated with monopoly, collective action prob-
lems, and externalities in a wide variety of bargaining contexts. In some
cases, the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions is used to take back some
of the power which had been conferred upon government officials in the
first instance.
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danger of government overreaching through its ability to create de-
pendency through its wealth:
The danger ... is that Leviathan, swollen with tax dollars,
will buy up people's liberty. Moved not by redistributive
frenzy but by the desire to expand the sphere of state power
by exerting moral and social control that it could not constitu-
tionally impose directly, the state will buy people out to con-
trol their decision-making.233
Sullivan's analysis leads her to conclude that "[a]n appropriate test
would subject to strict review any government benefit condition
whose primary purpose or effect is to pressure recipients to alter a
choice about exercise of a preferred constitutional liberty in a direc-
tion favored by government., 234  According to her, focusing on
whether conditions coerce government beneficiaries is too narrow.
This is because government action "that inhibits freedom but falls
short of 'coercion' has long been held ... to infringe constitutional
rights."
235
233 Sullivan, supra note 170, at 1494.
234 Id. at 1499-1500. Sullivan attempts to reconcile the court's unconstitu-
tional conditions cases by exploring three approaches: the "coercion" approach,
(which "locates the harm of rights-pressuring conditions on government benefits in
their coercion of the beneficiary"); the "corruption" theory or "germaneness of the
condition to the benefit" approach, (taking the position that the less germane, the
more like manipulation or extortion a condition is said to be, and the greater the judi-
cial scrutiny that should attach"); and the "commodification" theory or "inalienabil-
ity" approach (which although not prominent in the cases deserves consideration
because it treats "some constitutional rights ... [as] inalienable . . . [which] therefore
may not be surrendered even through voluntary exchange)." Id. at 1419-21 and 1476-
77.
She concludes that none of the three theories explain why conditions on benefits that
pressure preferred liberties should receive the same strict scrutiny as "direct" con-
straints. She argues that the court should adopt a "systemic approach" because only
then it can protect against three distributive dangers of unconstitutional conditions:
(i) the alteration of the balance between government and right-holders, a characteristic
form of government overreaching; (ii) redistribution of constitutional rights as to
which government has obligations of evenhandedness, and (iii) the creation of an
undesirable caste hierarchy among those who do and do not depend on government
benefits. Id. at 1490
235 Id. at 1454. See e.g., Thornburgh v. American Coll. of Obst. & Gyn., 476
U.S. 747 (1986) (declaring unconstitutional specified provisions of Pennsylvania's
1982 Abortion Control Act that infringed upon women's rights to abort unwanted
pregnancies); City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416,
442-51 (1983) (invalidating a regulation that sought to tip the scales of information
about reproductive choice in favor of the government's preference for childbirth).
Also, in Sullivan's eyes, the coercion analysis fails because (a) "the necessary base-
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5. The Separate Affiliate Doctrine Will Not Save the Plan
One measure of whether a denial of funding is a "penalty" is the
degree to which it prevents the recipient from using outside funds to
perform the non-funded activity. The "separate affiliate doctrine"
provides that when government prohibits a federally funded organiza-
tion from engaging in certain activities, the prohibition will only be
upheld if it allows the subsidized entity to create a "separate affiliate"
that uses private funds to support the federally disfavored activity. In
other words, "government may not withhold funds from the recipient
for engaging in the proscribed activity, provided the recipient does so
through its separate affiliate." 236 In cases involving partial public
subsidies to organizations that also use private funds, "courts treat as a
mere nonsubsidy conditions on use of the public funds, but treat as a
penalty the extension of the same conditions to use of private
funds. 237 The doctrine is developed in Regan v. Taxation with Rep-
23823
resentation  and FCC v. League of Women Voters.239
In Taxation with Representation (TWR), federal tax laws that con-
ditioned tax-exempt status on the requirement that the organization
not participate in lobbying activities were upheld. The Court stressed
that the challenged Internal Revenue Code section did not bar organi-
zations from lobbying altogether, it merely prevented them from using
tax deductible donations in their lobbying activities, and therefore the
Code did not violate the organization's First Amendment right to
lobby.24° As explained in Justice Blackmun's concurring opinion, the
result under the First Amendment rested entirely upon the Court's
assumption that nonprofit organizations may create an affiliate to pur-
sue their lobbying activities without loosing their tax exempt status.
24 1
Had Congress denied tax benefits for nonlobbying activities on ac-
count of an organization's lobbying, the Court would have invalidated
the condition under the holding of Speiser.242 The court noted that the
lines are elusive, once government benefits in this context are conceded to be gratui-
tous"; and (b) "government, which differs significantly from any given individual,
can burden rights to autonomy through means other than coercion." Sullivan, supra
note 170, at 1456.
236 C. Andrew McCarthy, Comment, The Prohibition on Abortion Counseling
and Referral in Federally-Funded Family Planning Clinics. 77 CAL. L. REv. 1181,
1194 (1989).
237 Id.
238 461 U.S. 540 (1983).
239 468 U.S. 364 (1984).
240 461 U.S. at 545.
241 Id. at 552 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
242 Id. at 545.
2003]
HEALTH MATRIX
organization had the option of establishing a dual corporate structure
by taking the not "unduly burdensome" steps of incorporating sepa-
rately and maintaining separate financial records. 243 Moreover, the
regulation was not content based because the ban applied to all lobby-
ing regardless of their content.244
On the other hand, in League of Women Voters, the Court invali-
dated a federal statute denying federal public broadcasting funds to
stations that engage in editorializing. 245 There, the federal funds sub-
sidized only a portion of a public broadcasting station's expenses, but
the anti-editorializing condition burdened the use of private funds to
editorialize because the station was not able to segregate its activities
according to the source of its funding.246 Since government could not
condition funds on a requirement that the stations relinquish their right
to editorialize altogether, the statute was invalid. However, the Court
recognized that were Congress to permit the recipient stations to "es-
tablish 'affiliate' organizations which could then use the station's
facilities to editorialize with nonfederal funds, such a statutory
mechanism would plainly be valid.,
247
On its face, the Bush plan would seem to fall within the doctrine.
After all, the plan does not "ban" research on non-approved stem
cells; it merely requires that the researchers who choose to work on
them do so in a separate facility. But closer examination reveals prob-
lems with this simplified look at the plan. Stem cell research is car-
ried out in sophisticated facilities, with expensive equipment and
trained staff. It is a far more expensive and difficult task to set up a
wholly independent research facility than the "unduly burdensome"
step of incorporating separately and carrying out "low-tech" lobbying
activities, as in TWR. A research facility is more like a "radio station"
with its sophisticated equipment. But in League of Women Voters, the
Court would have upheld the regulation only if it allowed the use of
the same "station facility" for privately funded editorializing.
Under the Bush plan, using the same facility for federally funded
research and privately funded research on non-approved cells is a fed-
eral offense and would result in revocation of both the scientist and
research institution's funding. Drawing a sufficiently clear line be-
tween activities and infrastructure supported by the federal govern-
ment and those supported only by the private sector in a single labora-
tory or university is difficult. The establishment of separate privately
243 Id. at 544 & n.6.
244 Id. at 548.
245 486 U.S. 364
246 Id.
247 Id. (emphasis added).
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supported laboratories that are completely free of federal funds, such
as the University of Wisconsin's WiCell Institute, entails substantial
costs to duplicate infrastructure, equipment, personnel and such meas-
ures may not be feasible for many academic institutions.248 Moreover,
the WiCell Agreement directly forecloses a researcher's use of pri-
vately derived new stem cells. The restriction on a researcher's use of
private funds are unmistakably grave and sufficiently different to
those in previous cases to warrant them impermissible.
6. Rust's Government Project vs. Academic Research
The court in Rust characterized the promotion or discussion of
abortion as outside the scope of a Title X program. 49 Moreover, the
Court distinguished past unconstitutional conditions cases by charac-
terizing them as "cases involving situations in which the Government
has placed a condition on the recipient of the subsidy rather than on a
particular program or service., 250 But one distinguishing factor be-
tween the Rust situation and the Bush plan is that Rust dealt with a
"program" or "service" set up by the government. The Court stated
that "we have here not the case of a general law singling out a disfa-
vored group on the basis of speech content, but a case of the govern-
ment refusing to fund activities ... which are specifically excluded
from the scope of the project funded." The "scope" of the Title X
program, the Court said, was not "prenatal care, but to encourage fam-
ily planning. 25' Seen in this light, the restrictions were characterized
as prohibiting a project grantee (usually a health care organization)
from "engaging in activities outside of the project's scope. 252
Bush's plan, on the other hand, does not fund a service or project
such as the one in Rust, but applies to individual recipients of federal
funds and their plans for future research. Indeed the plan draws a line
between individual research scientists not based on which area of re-
search they are engaged in (which might have some rational connec-
tion to a legitimate government interest), but on which cells these sci-
entists choose to work on. So it separates scientists based on their
241 Stem Cells, 2001: Hearings Before a Subcomm. of the Comm. on Appro-
priations, 107th Cong., I' Sess. 85-86 (2001) (statement of Carl Gulbrandsen, Ph.D.,
Managing Director, Wisconsin Alumni Research Foundation, President, WiCell Re-
search Institute, Inc.).
249 Rust, 500 U.S. at 194 (stating "This is not a case of the government 'sup-
pressing a dangerous idea,' but of a prohibition on a project grantee or its employees
from engaging in activities outside of the project's scope").
250 Id. at 197 (emphasis in the original).
251 Id. at 193.
252 Id. at 194.
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choice of technique. Moreover, most of such research is carried out in
academic university setting. These scientists are not government em-
ployees, and their stem cell research activities does not fall outside the
scope of the mission of their research or the university's goals. Even
the majority in Rust recognized that in the context of First Amend-
ment speech rights, "the university is a traditional sphere of free ex-
pression so fundamental to the functioning of our society that the
Government's ability to control speech within that sphere by means of
conditions attached to the expenditure of Government funds is re-
stricted by the vagueness and breadth doctrines of the First Amend-
ment." 253 The implication is that the restriction of researchers' activi-
ties in a university setting is fundamentally different from, and should
be subject to stricter scrutiny than, restrictions faced by healthcare
employees of a federal program.
Moreover, four Justices of the Court disagreed with the Court's
reasoning in Rust, stating:
Until today, the Court never has upheld viewpoint-based sup-
pression of speech simply because that suppression was a
condition upon the acceptance of public funds. Whatever
may be the Government's power to condition the receipt of its
largess upon the relinquishment of constitutional rights, it
surely does not extend to a condition that suppresses the
recipient's cherished freedom of speech based solely
upon the content or viewpoint of that speech.
254
The Court's ruling in Rust flies in the face of years of precedents and
their principles as exemplified by the statement in F. C. C. v. League of
Women Voters255 that "regulation of speech that is motivated by noth-
ing more than a desire to curtail expression of a particular point of
view on controversial issues of general interest is the purest example
of a 'law... abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press.'
2 56
In sum, there is a fine line to be drawn between a mere nonsub-
sidy of an activity, and burdening the use of alternatives to the activity
253 Id. at 200.
254 Id. at 207 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citations omitted). See also Keyi-
shian v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of the state of N.Y., 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967).
255 468 U.S. 364 (1984).
256 Id. at 383-84 (quoting Consolidated Edison Co. of N.Y. v. Public Service
Comm'n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 530, 546 (1980)). See also Police Dept. of Chicago v.
Mosely, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972)("above all else, the First Amendment means that
government has no power to restrict expression because of its message, its ideas, its
subject matter, or its content").
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to such an extent that practically forecloses the alternative as an op-
tion. In the present context, the Bush plan crosses that line. Its effect
is not only to encroach on the fundamental right of researchers - to
pursue their research without government interference and to contract
freely - but to restrict the future development of stem cell research by
scientists who do not subscribe to the government's condition.
V. CONCLUSION
The Bush condition should be subjected to strict scrutiny under
the unconstitutional conditions doctrine. Not only does it coerce sci-
entists to give up their rights, but goes further by affecting people who
choose not to contract with the government, by expanding its already
extensive monopoly in funding of stem cell research in a way which
truly restricts a researcher's alternative choices, and by ultimately
controlling an area of scientific inquiry by executive order, without
prior democratic debate on the subject.
The stem cell research debate has been characterized as an exten-
sion of the abortion debate, focusing on the rights of IVF embryos.
There is deep division in the Court over government conditioning of
speech or activities that implicate the ever contentious abortion issue.
But issues surrounding stem cell research have only a tenuous rela-
tionship to the problems surrounding abortion. They do not implicate
a fetus in the mother's womb, the stem cells in themselves have no
potential to turn into human beings and the research activity does not
put embryos at a greater risk of destruction than they would otherwise
face. On the other hand, stem cell research offers enormous potential
benefit to thousands of patients with incurable diseases. Adding the
First Amendment arguments for the protection of scientific inquiry to
the restrictive effect of the Bush plan on researchers' choice is suffi-
cient to extend the unconstitutional conditions doctrine to this area.
The president can choose whether he wishes to fund stem cell re-
search or not, but while researchers remain within their legal bounda-
ries, he may not use the government purse to coerce them into a
choice that he approves of.
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